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“The fortunes of nations are inextricably tied to the fortunes of women. It is this simple: 
Where women flourish, their families flourish. And where families flourish, communities 
and nations flourish. Issues affecting women and their families are not “soft” issues to be 
relegated to the side-lines of serious debate. Rather, they are amongst the hardest and most 
important issues we face.” 1 
                                                 
1 Clinton (1998) p. xiii. 
 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Presentation of topic and research question 
Ghana is a country on the West Coast of Africa with a population of about twenty-five 
million people.
 2
  Women represent about 51 of the population.
3
 Not long after Ghana 
became independent from British colonial rule, she became a member of the United 
Nations (UN), and is very engaged in the activities of the organization.
4
 Ghana is also a 
member of the African Union. As a result of Ghana´s membership in these and other 
international and regional organizations, she has signed and ratified many international and 
regional conventions that aim at protecting the rights of women. The most important of 
these conventions are the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
5
, and the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) 6. This makes Ghana 
one of the countries in Africa that aim at protecting women from marginalization, 
oppression and discrimination. 
 
Even though, Ghana has made significant improvements in women’s rights after ratifying 
the CEDAW and other international human rights conventions, there still remains a lot to 
                                                 
2Europa Regional Surveys of the World. Africa South of the Sahara 2012 (2012) p. 576. 
3 http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf/vpd_undcf.pdf. Accessed 07.11.2013. 
4 http://www.un.int/ghana/. Accessed 09.07.2013. 
5 The CEDAW, also known as ”the women´s convention” (see for instance Hellum (1999)) is the most 
comprehensive international convention that specifically aims at protecting the rights of women. It came into force 
in 1981 and was adopted by Ghana in 1986. Hellum (1999) p.22 rightly describes the convention as  ”a socio-legal 
tool which within a single and unified framework is intended to help women fit into social, economic and political 
modernization processes in all parts of the world”. Out of the 194 recognized countries in the world, 187 of them, 
including Norway, have ratified this convention. In the Western part of the world, the USA is the only country that 
is yet to ratify the CEDAW. Source: http://www.cedaw2012.org/index.php/press-room/fast-facts-about-cedaw. 
(Accessed 05.11.2013).  
6 The Maputo Protocol was adopted in 2003 and came into force in 2005. It was ratified by Ghana in 2007. This 
protocol can be described as the African version of the CEDAW. Like the CEDAW it also addresses the civil, 
economic and social rights of women. 
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be done in certain areas.  The matrimonial property rights of women upon divorce is one of 
such areas. This is a field where there is no formal legislation, and according to the courts, 
a spouse must show proof of substantial financial contribution in order to get a share in 
property acquired in the course of marriage (see chapter 3). However, in Ghana there are 
many women who do not work outside the home. In most cases, those who work outside 
the home earn much less than their husbands. This is because women account for majority 
of the “less paid and less prestigious” professions.7 There are also many women who work 




In many families, the income of the wife takes care of consumer expenditure like buying 
food and clothes for the family whiles the income of the husband is used to acquire 
properties and fund big projects.
9
 This is due to the fact that the work women do in the 
public sector is “often viewed as secondary to their family responsibilities and their income 
as supplementary rather than essential to the financial resources of family or household.”10 
As a result, a lot of women leave their matrimonial homes after several years of marriage 
without getting an equal share in property acquired during the marriage, because they are 
not able to show proof of the contributions they may have made towards the acquisition of 
the assets. 
 
In some countries, non-financial contribution to the acquisition of marital assets (especially 
the matrimonial home) in the form of home-making and other indirect contributions is 
accorded the same relevance as financial contribution. This means that property acquired in 
the course of the marriage is considered the jointly-acquired property of both spouses even 
in cases where the stay-home spouse (in most cases the woman) did not contribute 
financially to its acquisition. In Norway for instance, this principle was historically laid 
                                                 
7 Women And Law In West Africa. (2003) p. 20. 
8 Situational Analysis Of The Intestate Succession And Property Rights Of Spouses Legislation In Ghana (2011) p. 26-
27. 
9 Gandedzie (2012) 
10 Women And Law In West Africa. (2003) p. 21. 
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down in a case from the Norwegian Supreme court called Husmordommen
11
 (the house-
wife case) of 1975. This case is presented in detail in chapter 5. 
 
Until recently, the principle followed by the courts in Ghana when deciding on cases of 
property settlement upon divorce has been what has been described by the courts as the 
customary law principle laid down in Quartey v. Martey & Anor (1959), which states: 
 
“… by customary law it is a domestic responsibility of a man's wife and children to assist 
him in the carrying out of the duties of his station in life, e.g. farming or business.  The 
proceeds of this joint effort of a man and his wife and/or children, and any property, which 
the man acquires, with such proceeds are by customary law the individual property of the 
man.  It is not the joint property of the man and the wife and/or the children.  The right of 
the wife and the children is a right to maintenance and support from the husband and 
father.”12 
 
The Supreme Court has however laid down new principles in the course of the years, which 
seek to provide a better protection of the marital property rights of women upon divorce. 
This is because, even though article 22 (2) of Ghana´s constitution of 1992 (which is the 
constitution in force per today) entreats Parliament to legally empower women, as part of 
the process of ensuring an adequate protection of their marital property rights upon 
dissolution of marriage by divorce, this constitutional requirement has not been adhered to. 
One may ask what it means to legally empower women. 
 
According to the UN secretary general´s 2009 report on “legal empowerment of the poor 
and eradication of poverty” , legal empowerment can be defined as “the process of 
systematic change through which the poor are protected and enabled to use the law to 
advance their rights and their interests as citizens and economic actors”.13 (My italics). This 
                                                 
11 See Rt. 1975 p. 220 
12 Quartey v. Martey & Anor (1959) p. 380. 
13 Report of the UN Secretary General A/64/133 (2009) para 3.  
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report later has been described as the most authentic recommendation on legal 
empowerment that has a lot of influence as a resource for the UN system, its member states 
and all who are concerned with global development.
14
 Legal empowerment of women can 
therefore be defined as using the law to protect women and to enable women themselves to 
utilize the law “to advance their rights and their interests as citizens and economic actors.” 
 
It is observed in the Secretary General´s report that the notion of legal empowerment has its 
basis in the fundamental doctrines of human rights enshrined first and foremost in the UN´s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) of 1948 and other international human 
rights conventions.
15
 For instance it is stated in the UNDHR article 1 that “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” whilst article 17 acknowledges 
property rights as a basic human right that is to be enjoyed on equal basis by both men and 
women. “These international standards of human rights require that everyone’s basic rights, 
assets and livelihoods be effectively upheld and protected by the law.”16 (My italics). The 




From the definition of legal empowerment in the Secretary General´s report, it can be 
inferred that there is a connection between legal empowerment and the eradication of 
poverty. Apparently the UN´s Division for the Advancement of Women (DVA) shares the 
same view. This is because according to a 2007 report by the DVA on eradication of 
poverty and other development issues,
 18
 one of the reasons why women are susceptible to 
poverty is because of the “unequal distribution of resources within the family.” 19 This 
leads to the question of whether women in Ghana become susceptible to poverty when they 
leave their marriages without getting an equal share of assets they have contributed to 
accumulating in the course of the marriage is therefore one of the problems investigated in 
                                                 
14 See for instance Golub (2010) p. 11. 
15 Report of the UN Secretary General A/64/133 (2009) para. 12. 
16 Ibid para. 25. 
17 Svanikier (2007) p.10. 
18 Report of the UN´s Division for the Advancement of women A/62/187 (2007). 
19 Ibid para 5. 
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this study (see chapter 4).  This is because it can be argued that if women are left 
economically destitute upon divorce, they may find it difficult to gain “access to productive 
resources,”20 thereby making them susceptible to poverty. Legal empowerment can 
therefore be regarded as an essential aspect of the advocacy for the marital property rights 
of women upon divorce in Ghana.  
 
This study sets out to investigate the matrimonial property rights of women in Ghana upon 
divorce, with regard to the lack of substantive legislative guidelines on the subject matter.  
 
1.2 Definition of key terms in the study 
1.2.1 Marital or Matrimonial property 
For the purpose of this dissertation, marital or matrimonial property refers to all property 
acquired by any of the spouses in the course of the marriage.  
 
1.2.2 Sole Property (eneeie) 
Sole property refers to property that is owned entirely by one of the spouses.  
 
1.2.3 Common or jointly-owned property (sameie) 
Common or jointly-owned property is the opposite of sole property and in this study it 
refers to property acquired with the contribution of both spouses, where each of them has 
an exclusive ideal interest in the whole property, but none of them has the sole right of any 
part of the property. Accordingly, one spouse cannot sell or rent out more than his or her 
ideal share in the property.
 
 Both spouses have the same legal access to it and the same 
legal power to manage it. 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid 
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1.2.4 Community property (felleseie) 
In Norwegian family law, community property bears reference to property that is acquired 
with monies that are earned from the work of each of the spouses in the course of the 
marriage and whose value is open to division upon divorce.
21
 This means that property that 
a spouse owned before the marriage or acquired during the marriage by inheritance or by 
gift from a third person is not included in community property.
 
In the consept of 
community property, the value of community property is upon divorce divided equally 
between the spouses regardless of who bought it. 
 
1.2.5 Separate Property  
Separate property is the opposite of community property, and refers to property that is not 
subject to division either because the spouses have agreed that it should be so, or because 





1.2.6 Difference between community property/separate property and common 
property/sole   property 
The difference between community property/separate property and common property/sole 
property is that the concepts of community property and separate property are family law 
terminologies, which denote the property arrangements in marriage, and have nothing to do 
with the real ownership of the property.
23
 The terms common property and sole property on 
the other hand refer to the real ownership of property. The relationship between the two 
sets of terminologies is that each spouse´s share of the common property either belongs to 




                                                 
21 Lødrup (2004) p. 112 
22 Ibid p. 111 
23 Ibid p.112 
24 Ibid p. 114 
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The distinction between community property/separate property and common property/sole 
property is not entirely vital with regard to property settlement upon divorce in Ghana since 
Ghanaian family law, unlike that of some Western countries (like Norway
25
 and the 
community property states in the USA
26
) does not distinguish between these terminologies. 
For instance article 22 of the constitution only makes mention of ”jointly acquired” 
property, and in almost all the relevant case law available on the subject matter, the dispute 
is normally about sole-ownership or joint-ownership of a specific property. The 
respondents I interviewed as part of my research (see chapter 2) were also seemingly 
unaware of these two sets of terminologies.  
 
It may therefore not be wrong to say that there is no legal basis that entitles a spouse to half 
of the other spouse´s community property in Ghanaian law.
27
 Consequently, being regarded 
as co-owner of marital property is essential for a woman to be awarded a share in marital 
property upon divorce. Thus, what matters is whether a spouse gets a share of marital 
property upon divorce, irrespective of which of these terminologies is used as justification 
for awarding him or her the share of property.  
 
1.2.7 Discrimination against women 
In article 1 of the UN Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), discrimination against women is defined as: 
 
 “Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field”. 
                                                 
25 See lov om ekteskap av 4 juli. Nr. 47. 1991.  
26 Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems (2004) pp. 269-324. 
27 For the case of Norwegian family law, see ekteskapsloven § 58, which serves as the legal basis for awarding a 
spouse half of the other spouses´s community property upon divorce. 
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It is noteworthy that the prohibition against discrimination in the CEDAW is an 
independent prohibition.
28
 This means that the prohibition is self-reliant and can be invoked 
independent of other rules of law. Independent prohibitions of discrimination can be 
applied in many spheres of life, and not just the areas that are subject to protection in the 
same convention.
29
 The prohibition of discrimination in article 26 of the UN Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) is another example of independent prohibitions of 
discrimination.
30
 The opposite of independent discriminatory prohibitions is accessory 
discriminatory prohibitions. Such prohibitions may only be invoked in connection with the 
invocation of other human rights provisions. Examples of accessory discriminatory 
prohibitions are article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights Convention 
(ECHR)
31





For an act to qualify as discrimination against women in light of the CEDAW, it must 
fulfill certain conditions. What these conditions entail and how they apply to the object of 
my study is accounted for in chapter 5. 
 
1.3 Relevance Of The Research  
A lot of researches, campaigns and advocacies have been and are still being carried out on 
the protection of women’s rights in Ghana. The property rights of widows has been a major 
concern in the past, and widows´ legal rights have improved due to the introduction of the 
intestate succession law of 1985
33
, which seeks to protect the rights of widows/widowers 
                                                 
28 Emberland (2006) p. 200 
29 Ibid 
30 Craig (2005) p. 7. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Emberland (2006) p. 200. 
33 The Intestate Succession Law of 1985 (P.N.D.C.L 111) 
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and children upon the death of a spouse intestate.
34
 To a large extent, this law has helped to 
secure the marital property rights of widows in Ghana.
35
 Worthy of observation is that, the 
death of a husband establishes a legal relationship between the widow and the members of 
her deceased husband´s family, whilst for divorced women, the legal relationship 
established is between the woman and her estranged husband. The question is whether the 
marital property rights of women deserve greater protection upon the dissolution of 
marriage by death, than by divorce.  
 
In recent years, the focus has been on violence against women. This has also been dealt 
with on the legal plan through the introduction of the Domestic Violence Act (Act 732) of 
2007.
36
 A women´s right to marital property upon divorce is a very essential tool that can 
encourage her to leave a marriage that is characterized by violence and abuse. This is 
because when women are given an equal share in marital property upon divorce, it makes 
them economically independent, and they may not feel obliged to stay in a marriage for 
fear of being left economically destitute upon divorce. Thus, the object of this study can be 
regarded as an important contribution to the debate on spousal abuse.  
 
Despite the fact that the property rights of widows and violence against women have been 
dealt with on the legal plan and improvements have been made in these areas, the Ghanaian 
media is superfluous with information and news on violence against women, and literature 
is abundant with the inheritance rights of widows.
37
 However, one hardly hears about the 
property rights of spouses upon divorce even though this is an area with no formal 
legislation. This could imply that the economic protection of divorced economic protection 
is not regarded as an important problem in Ghana.  
 
Literature on the matrimonial property rights of women upon divorce in Ghana is very 
scanty and the few literature that exists on the topic barely call into question the extent to 
                                                 
34 Kuma (2012) 
35Shadow report to Ghana´s 3rd 4th and 5th CEDAW reports (2006) p. 31. 
36 Lithur (2012) 
37 Source: observations made during my fieldwork (2012) 
 10 
which the lack of legislation constitutes an unjustifiable differential treatment of women.
38
 
The fact that there is no law on this matter doesn’t seem to bother judicial writers and 
women’s rights advocates that much.39 Out of the many women´s human rights 
organizations in Ghana, there are only two
40
, which are actively working and campaigning 
for a bill on property settlement upon divorce to be put in place.  
 
This research seeks to contribute to the scanty literature that exists on the matrimonial 
property rights of women upon divorce in Ghana in light of the lack of formal statutory 
laws on the subject matter. Another objective of the study is to create awareness of the fact 
that the lack of legislation on the property rights of spouses upon divorce is a problem that 
needs to be dealt with, which often affects women; that the property rights of divorced 
women needs protection on equal footing with the property rights of widows. Whether or 
not Ghana´s refusal to make laws on this topic constitutes a breach of the non-
discriminatory clause in the CEDAW is also an important question that will be 
investigated, which could be important for creating awareness of this issue.  
 
1.4 Scope of the study 
It is essential to point out that this dissertation only seeks to discuss the division of 
matrimonial property upon divorce and is thus within the domain of family law. The rights 
of women to matrimonial property upon the death of the husband is therefore outside the 
scope of this study. This is because, upon the death of a spouse, the division of matrimonial 
property moves from within the domain of family law, into the domain of inheritance law. 
All the same, the overall goal of this thesis is not to give an exhaustive presentation of 
Ghanaian family law, neither is it to give a presentation of whether or not Ghana is heeding 
                                                 
38 See for instance Offei (2007), which is the curriculum in Family law at the University of Ghana, and Bowman 
(2003) pp 68-81 who merely present cases on property settlement by the courts without criticising the fact that 
there is no legislation on the subject matter.  
39 An exception is Svanikier (1997) who has made an effort to question the extent to which Ghana is adhering to 
her international obligations  in this regard, but devotes very limited space to it. 
40 Leadership and Advocacy for women in Africa (LAWA) and African Female Lawyers Association (AWLA)) 
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to her obligations in the CEDAW in general.  Accordingly, it is mainly the aspects of the 
CEDAW that pertain to the economic rights of women that will serve as part of the legal 
framework for this study.  
 
1.5 The Concept Of Family In Ghana – Matrilineal and Patrilineal Family 
Systems  
It is important to understand the concept of “family” in the Ghanaian society because the 
perception of “family” is relevant for several of the issues raised in this study. Thus, a short 
presentation of the concept of family is given in this section of the study, but the influence 
this perception of family can have on property settlement upon divorce is discussed in 
detail in chapters four and six.  
 
Just like many other societies, the family institution forms the basis of the Ghanaian 
society.  The medium by which one can form a family in Ghana is through marriage.
41
 
Everyone is expected to marry after a certain age even though not everyone gets married 
before establishing families. A 2008 report by the Ghana Statistical Service
42
 indicates that 
58.8 % of Ghanaians above the age of 18 are either married or have been married before. 
The report further states that the average “age at first marriage” is 22.5 years. This suggests 
that most people get married before they earn enough money to buy property. 
Consequently, it may not be wrong to say that most matrimonial property (especially 
matrimonial homes) are acquired in the course of marriage, most probably with the effort 
of both spouses.  
 
When a Ghanaian uses the word ”family,” he or she could be referring to both the nuclear 
and the extended family. Kuenyehia defines the concepts of family in Ghana as follows: 
 
                                                 
41 Kuenyehia  (1978) p. 317. 
42 Ghana Living Standards Survey (2008) p.7. In a place like Norway on the other hand, the average age at first 
marriage for women as at 2003 was 29.7 years. Source: store norske leksikon. Availavle at 
http://snl.no/ekteskap#menuitem3. Accessed 04.11.2013. 
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“The family in Ghana denotes a large social group of people all tracing from a common 
ancestor, male or female. The social group, the members of which are lineally descended in 
a direct female line from a common female ancestor is known as the matrilineal family. 
That in which the members are lineally descended in a direct male line from a common 
male ancestor is known as the patrilineal family.” 43 
 
The concept of matrilineal and patrilineal family systems is an essential factor in property 
rights and other issues in Ghana, and is therefore essential in this study.  
 
This is how Ollennu accounts for the matrilineal and patrilineal family systems: 
 
”Thus of all the important qualities in a man, Ghanaian belief attached special significance 
to two things, (1) the sacred blood which sustains and maintains his physical and material 
body and (2) the spirit which constitutes his full personality and builds him up into a real 
being, a man. The former is of maternal ancestry, the latter of paternal ancestry”. 44 
 
According to Ghanaian customary law, a married woman is not considered as part of her 
husband´s family because, she and her husband are not related by blood. Also, customary 
law does not support the joint acquisition of properties by people not related by blood.
 45
 
Thus, the maintenance of separate identities and of separate properties is the norm under 
customary law.
46
 Since spouses are not considered to be related by blood, where spouses 
both contribute to the acquisition of a specific property in the course of their marriage, 
disputes regarding sole-ownership of the property arise upon dissolution of the marriage. 
The topic of discussion in chapter 3 is the extent to which the courts may have departed 
from this principle of customary law. 
 
                                                 
43 Kuenyehia  (1978) p. 316 
44 Ollenu (1966) p. 71 cited in Kunyehia (1978) p.317 
45 Takyi (2012). This is also observed by the courts in the cases of Yeboah v. Yeboah (1974) and Abebreseh v. Kaah 
1976 which are discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
46 Situational Analysis Of The Intestate Succession And Property Rights Of Spouses Legislation In Ghana (2011) p. 27 
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1.5.1 The Plurality Of Marital Forms In Ghana 





1) Marriage under Customary Law 
2) Marriage under the Marriage of Mohammedan Ordinance 
3) Marriage under the Marriage Ordinance  
 
1.5.1.1 Marriage Under Customary Law 
Marriage under Customary Law, which is ”the personal law of the Ghanaian,” was the only 
form of marriage acknowledged by law in Ghana until the year 1884.
48
 Customary 
marriages are often celebrated at home as a union between two families (the families of the 
spouses). Under customary law, polygyny
49
, which means that a man can have many wives 
at the same time, is permitted.
50
   
 
Almost all Ghanaian marriages are first celebrated customarily before they are eventually 




During the celebration of customary marriages, the man gives some money and drinks to 
the woman´s family as her bride price. Thus, in order to dissolve a customary marriage, the 
woman´s family has to return the money and the drinks to the man´s family.
52
 The spouse 
whose action led to the divorce may be asked to compensate the other spouse by paying an 
amount of money to that spouse. For instance if the husband “beats the wife persistently 
without just cause”53 and the wife decides to divorce him because of that, he has to 
compensate her upon divorce. On the other hand, if the divorce is as a result of the wife 
                                                 
47 Kuenyehia (1978) p. 318 
48 Ghana´s  report to the CEDAW committee (CEDAW/C/GHA/3-5) (2006) para. 199. 
49 Polygyny is the opposite of polyandry where a woman can be married to more than one man at the same time. 
Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyandry. Accessed: 31.10.2013. 
50 Svanikier (1997) p.81. 
51 Kuenyehia (1978) p.318. 
52 Offei (2007) p. 203. 
53 Ibid 199. 
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committing adultery for instance, then she will have to compensate the husband. “There is 
nothing called division of marital property upon divorce in customary marriages. This is 
because spouses are supposed to acquire property separately.”54  
 
Customary marriages can also be dissolved in court if the parties so desire, c.f. articles 1 
and 41 of Ghana´s Matrimonial Causes Act (Act 367). However, not many people married 




1.5.1.2 Marriage Under Mohammedan Ordinance56 
About 16 % of the Ghanaian population are Muslims.
57
 Ghanaian Muslims have to register 
their marriages under the Mohammedan Ordinance before the marriage can be regarded as 
valid in Islam.
58
 Many Islamic marriages in Ghana are not registered under the 
Mohammedan ordinance and are therefore regarded as customary marriages.
59
 Islamic 
marriages are also potentially polygamous since the Koran permits men to marry up to four 




A marriage registered under the Mohammedan ordinance can be dissolved by divorce if 
both spouses consent to it.
61
 In the absence of agreement, the wife cannot divorce herself 
from her husband without his consent (except under a contract made before or after the 
marriage). However, “she may, in some cases, obtain a divorce by judicial decree”. 62 The 
                                                 
54 Takyi (2012)  
55 Gandedzie (2012) 
56 Ordinance Capitulo 129 of 1907.  
57 Europa Regional Surveys of the World. Africa South of the Sahara 2012 (2012) p. 584. 
58 Svanikier (2007) p. 81 
59 Ibid.  
60 Qur´an 4:3. Available at 
http://wikiislam.net/wiki/Dealing_Justly_with_Wives_and_Orphans_(Qur'an_4:3)#Qur.27an_4:3. Accessed 
31.10.2013. 
61 Offei (2007) p. 266.  
62 Ibid 
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husband on the other hand can divorce his wife whenever he wants and he does not need to 




No case of division of marital property upon divorce under the Mohammedan ordinance is 
“readily available”. 64 However, since the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) (1971) is 
applicable to all the three marital forms, Ghanaian jurists believe that if such a case is 
brought before the courts, the property will be divided based on the discretion of the courts, 
in accordance with section 20 of the MCA.
65
 The non-existence of relevant case law on 
property settlement upon the dissolution of registered Islamic marriages suggests that 
property settlement upon divorce in the Islamic marriages (if any) is most probably 
conducted at home by the spouses themselves. Whether or not women married under the 
Mohammedan Ordinance get a fair share of marital property upon divorce is therefore 
uncertain. 
 
1.5.1.3 Marriage under The Marriage Ordinance66 
Under the Marriage Ordinance, the marriage is celebrated and registered either in church or 
at the office of a Marriage Registrar. Unlike Customary and Islamic marriages, polygyny is 
forbidden for those married under the Marriage Ordinance, c.f. sections 263 (1) and 262 of 
Ghana´s Criminal Offences Act.
67
 An ordinance marriage may be dissolved by the courts if 
it “has broken down beyond reconciliation”, c.f. article 2 of the MCA. The courts can 
conduct property settlement upon divorce if the parties so desire. 
 
The effect this plurality of marital forms can have on the division of marital property is 
presented in chapters four and six. 
                                                 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid p. 287. 
65 Ibid. This view was also expressed by some of the jurists I interviewed in the course of my research. 
66 Ordinance Capitulo 127 of 1884 (revised in 1951) 
67 Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). 
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In its comments to Ghana´s combined third, fourth and fifth periodic report to the CEDAW 
committee on the implementation of the CEDAW in Ghana, the committee urged the 
Ghana government to “enact uniform legislation on marriage and family in conformity with 
article 16 of the” CEDAW.68  
 
1.6 The Ghana legal system, the use of precedents and the hierarchy of the 
courts  
Since there are no substantive legislative guidelines on property settlement upon divorce in 
Ghana, cases on property settlement brought before the courts are solved based on 
guidelines outlined in judicial precedents. Precedent in Ghana, just like in most common 
law countries, constitutes a fraction of the authoritative sources of law.
69
 The use of judicial 
precedent means that the courts apply the rulings in previous cases when the case has 
similar facts as the previous ruling.
70
 This has been described as stare decisis, a Latin word 
which means “to stand by things decided”.71 When a judge is deciding on a later issue and 
the principle of stare decisis is pertinent to that issue, he must consider the previous higher 
court´s decision in his ruling. It is noteworthy that it is only the section of an earlier ruling, 
“which stated the rule of law upon which the decision was based”(the ratio decidendi), 




In order for the principle of stare decisis to function effectively in a legal system, there has 
to be a power structure between the courts. This is because the importance of the court has 





                                                 
68 CEDAW/C/BIH/Q/35 (2006) para. 25. 
69 Quansah (2011) p.153 
70 Ibid. 
71  Black´s Law dictionary (2004) p. 1443. 




Hierarchy of the courts in Ghana.
74
 





The Supreme Court, which is the final court of appeal in Ghana, is not obliged to abide by 
the decisions of any other court. Also, “while treating its own previous decisions as 
normally binding, the Supreme court may depart from a previous decision when it appears 
to it right to do so, (whereas) all other courts (are) bound to follow the decisions of the 
                                                 
74 Quansah (2011) p.162. 
 18 
supreme court on questions of law”, cf. article 129 (2) and (3) of Ghana´s constitution. The 
Appeal Court on the other hand is “bound by its own previous decisions”, cf. article 136 (5) 
of the constitution, and the decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of law. The High 
Court and The Regional Tribunals are obliged to follow the relevant precedents of the 
Supreme Court and the Court of appeal, c.f. article 136 (5) of the constitution. The Lower 
Courts have to follow the decisions of all the aforementioned courts (i.e. the regional 
tribunals, the high court, the court of appeal and the supreme court).
75
 However, whether or 
not the courts beneath the Supreme Court always observe this constitutional requirement is 
a question that may need further investigation. This is done in chapter 6.  
 
1.7 Sources of law used in this thesis 
This dissertation falls mainly within three disciplines of law, namely Ghanaian family law, 
sociology of law and international human rights. As a result, both local Ghanaian sources 
of law and international sources of law that Ghana has consented to, form the legal basis of 
this study.  
 
1.7.1 Laws Of Ghana: Written Sources Of General And Customary Law 
The expression “source of law” can have several meanings.  Quansah defines it as “those 
agencies by which rules of conduct acquire the character of law by becoming objectively 
definite, uniform and above all compulsory.” 76  This suggests that there are many sources 
of law in every legal system. 
 
1.7.1.1 Legislation: The 1992 constitution of Ghana and the Matrimonial causes 
Act 
 
                                                 
75 Ibid p.164 
76 Ibid p. 129 
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Since Ghana gained independence in 1957, three military coups d´état have subverted the 
constitution in function.
77
 The current constitution is the constitution of the Fourth 




 Accordingly, unless otherwise 
mentioned, any reference made to “the constitution” in this dissertation refers to the 1992 
constitution of Ghana.  
 
The Constitution is “the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent 
with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”, 
c.f. article 2 of the constitution.  The entire chapter 5 of the constitution is an enshrinement 
of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Ghana, and the 
constitution´s article 22, which entreats parliament to enact legislation regulating the 
property rights of spouses, is placed under chapter 5. Because of this, the constitution 
served as a rich source of law and also a rich source of information about the extent to 
which the written supreme laws of Ghana seek to protect the matrimonial property rights of 
Ghanaian women.  
 
Ghana´s matrimonial causes Act of 1971 served as a good starting point with regard to the 
sources of law I used. It was after I read it and found that it has no statutory legislation on 
how marital property is to be divided upon divorce that I shifted my focus to other sources 
of law. 
 
1.7.1.2 Case Law 
As mentioned in chapter 1.6, case law is an essential source of customary law in Ghana. 
Since there is no formal legislation on how marital property is to be divided upon divorce, 
consulting and analyzing relevant case law was the only way of finding out what the courts 
                                                 
77 The first republican constitution of 1960 was overthrown in 1966, the second one of 1969 was overthrown in 
1972 and the third republican Constitution of 1979 was overthrown in 1981. Quansah (2011) p. 130 
78 Ibid p. 133. 
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use as a starting point when deciding on such cases. In the course of my research, I read 
and analyzed 31 cases on property settlement upon divorce decided by the Superior Courts 
of Judicature, i.e. the High Courts, Appeal Courts and the Supreme Court. Not all the cases 
I read are mentioned due to the limited framework of the study. However, the cases that 
have played pivotal roles and served as turning points in the history of property settlement 
by the courts are mentioned.  
 
1.7.2 International Conventions 
The question of to what extent Ghana can be said to be meeting or breaching her 
international women´s rights obligations is an essential part of this dissertation (see chapter 
5). Consequently, the CEDAW, which is the most comprehensive convention, aimed at 
protecting the rights of women is one of the legal frameworks of this study. 
 
It can be argued that the travaux preparatoires (preparatory works) of a convention can 
give indications or some guidelines as to how the convention is to be understood. However, 
Elgesem
79
 contends that the travaux preparatoires of a treaty are often not to be accorded 
much weight when interpreting the treaty. He argues that that explanatory reports prepared 
by expert groups on the other hand, have a special status and are to be considered as part of 
the “context” as described in article 31 (2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Interpretation of Treaties. In accordance with Elgesem´s line of thought, I found out after 
consulting some of the travaux préparatoires of the CEDAW that they give an insight into 
what the contracting parties meant when they were signing the convention, but do not give 
specific guidelines as to how the convention is to be interpreted. Thus, extensive use has 
been made of explicative documents such as the CEDAW committee´s
80
 general 
                                                 
79 Elgesem (2003) p. 5 
80 The CEDAW Committee is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the CEDAW, c.f. 
article 17 of the CEDAW. It consists of 23 experts on   women’s rights from around the world. States Parties to the 
CEDAW are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights of the Convention are 
implemented, c.f. article 18. During its sessions the Committee considers each State party report and addresses its 
concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations, c.f. article 20.   
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recommendations and the general recommendations of other related conventions in my 
effort to answer some of the questions raised in chapter 5 of this study. This is in 
accordance with article 31 (2) a of the Vienna convention (1969)
 81
 which states that “any 
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty” shall be regarded as part of the context of the treaty.  
 
According to article 31 (3) c of the Vienna convention, another means of interpreting a 
convention is by applying “rules of international law that are applicable in the relations 
between the parties”. Other multilateral treaties are considered as some of such applicable 
rules.
82
 In order to be applicable, these rules must be rules that pertain to what the term of 
the treaty is about, and they must be in force at the time the treaty is being interpreted.
83
 In 
light of this, the Maputo protocol, which in many ways can be considered as the African 
version of the CEDAW, and other conventions ratified by Ghana, which can throw more 
light on the CEDAW and its interpretation have also been applied. Examples of these are 
the UN Declaration On Human Rights, the UN Charter, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social And Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. These conventions have only been used to throw more light on the 
CEDAW. The aim has not been to use them as the main legal framework for this study.  
 
1.7.3 Legal textbooks and International Human Rights Literature 
Many legal textbooks and literature on international human rights have served as sources of 
law in this dissertation. This is because the arguments the writers provide, though they 
                                                 
81 Ghana signed this convention in 1969 but has not yet ratified it. Thus, because Ghana ratified the CEDAW in 
1986, applying the guidelines fleshed out in the Vienna convention can be said to be in accordance with article 4 of 
the convention, which states that the Convention applies only to treaties that are concluded by States after the 
Convention entered into force with regard to such States. 
82 Villiger (2009) p. 433 
83 Ibid. 
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cannot be regarded as sources of law in themselves, are often of help to adjudicators when 




1.8 Legal Empowerment and Structure of Thesis 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters.  In chapter 3, I make an effort to determine 
what the rule of law regarding property settlement upon divorce is in Ghana per today by 
analyzing and interpreting relevant case law on the subject matter. 
 
As already observed, part of this research lies between the disciplines of law and sociology. 
The concept of legal empowerment as defined above (see 1.1) relates to the issue of using 
legal mechanisms to ensure that women get what they are rightfully entitled to. It is 
therefore built on the supposition that there is a difference between having the right to 
something, and actually getting what one is entitled to.  In order to make a compelling case 
for the use of formal legislation as the best way of legally empowering Ghanaian women 
with regard to their marital property rights upon divorce, it is essential to clarify the extent 
to which such formal legislation is necessary.  
 
Accordingly, the topic of discussion in chapter 4 is whether there are cultural and socio-
legal realities in the Ghanaian society which hinder women from actually getting the share 
of marital property they are entitled to, in accordance with the judge-made non statutory 
rule of law for the division of marital property presented in chapter 3. A positive answer to 
this question would imply that many Ghanaian women do not in fact get the share of 
marital property they are entitled to according to the non-statutory rule of law on property 
settlement upon divorce, and that perspectively, there is the need for further legal action. In 
relation to the objective of my study, this further action would entail the codification of the 
marital property rights of women, in a way that effectively remedies the effects of these 
socio-legal realities. 
 
                                                 
84 Quansah (2011) p. 17. 
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Although this aspect of legal empowerment as presented in chapter 4 may depict the need 
for formal legislation on property settlement upon divorce, it would not necessarily mean 
that Ghana is legally obliged to adopt such legislation. This is because a claim that Ghana 
is obliged to make such legislation must have a legal basis. There are two possible legal 
bases that can be invoked in this regard. These are the Constitution and Ghana´s obligations 
based on international human rights conventions. The latter is discussed in Chapter 5 where 
the focus is on the extent to which the lack of statutory laws on property settlement upon 
divorce in Ghana constitutes a violation of Ghana’s obligations in the CEDAW. If it is 
found that the CEDAW requires Ghana to enact legislation on the subject matter, then it 
would imply that empowering women with regard to their marital property rights upon 
divorce through the use of formal legislation is a human right in light of the CEDAW. This 
would further imply that, the lack of substantive laws on property settlement upon divorce 
in Ghana constitutes a breach of the CEDAW. 
 
In chapter 6, I present my observations and conclusions after conducting my research.  
Possible challenges that may be faced in an effort to effectively implement future statutory 
laws on property settlement upon divorce are also discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, I 
present future prospects for research in this area. 
 
In my effort to answer the questions that are raised in chapters three to five, I had to apply a 
variety of methodological approaches. Consequently, chapter 2 of the study is a chapter 
devoted to presenting the different methodological approaches that were used to 
accomplish this study. Some ethical and social challenges I faced during the research are 
also discussed in this chapter. 
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2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned above, different methodological approaches have been used in 
accomplishing this research. The data for this research was gathered from both written and 
oral sources in Ghana as well as literature in Norway. In my effort to determine what the 
current rule of law on marital property upon divorce in Ghana is per today, which is 
presented in chapter 3, I had to find relevant case law and apply legal research 
methodology in analyzing and interpreting them. 
 
In chapter 5 which is the international human rights chapter, where I discuss the extent to 
which the lack of legislation on property settlement in Ghana constitutes a breach of the 
CEDAW, I make use of methods of interpretation of human rights treaties as established in 
international customary law. This is presented in chapter 5.3 of the study. 
 
This project could not have been carried out without empirical research. Thus, I was in 
Ghana from the period 29
th
 November to 29
th
 December to gather relevant empirical data as 
part of the study. The findings of this empirical research are presented in chapters four and 
six. Sections 2.2 to 2.4 of this chapter seeks to give a presentation of how I used generally 
accepted methods of data collection and data analysis to carry out my empirical research. 
 
2.2 Pre-research Arrangements 
I started preparing for my research by reading the scanty literature on the rights of women 
in Ghana I found here in Norway. In order to broaden my horizon I also read a lot on 
women´s rights in Africa in general.
85
 A more concrete research was carried out when I 
went to Ghana. I contacted some people through telephone calls and emails, who put me 
                                                 
85 Bowman (2003), Hellum (1999) and Banda (2005) proved very useful in this regard. 
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into contact with some of my key respondents before I arrived in Ghana. This facilitated 
the commencement of my empirical research.  
 
2.3 Data Collection Methods  
The data for this dissertation was collected through analysis of relevant material gathered 
through interviews, case law, and other written documents. Because these methods were 
rich sources of material and information for my research, I deemed them relevant for the 
study. 
 
2.4 Types Of Data 
2.4.1 Primary Data - Qualitative Interviews 
My primary data was gathered through qualitative interviews
86
 conducted in Ghana. By 
interviewing some carefully chosen people, I got answers to the questions I had regarding 
the legal and social issues pertaining to the matrimonial property rights of women upon 
divorce in Ghana. 
 
2.4.1.1  Choosing Respondents – Sampling 
I interviewed three categories of respondents: people with expert opinion (this group 
consisted of people with legal background), academicians (this was a group of highly 
educated people with different educational backgrounds apart from law) semi-literates and 
illiterates (this was a group of people who have been through the process of property 
settlement upon divorce). I made sure I interviewed quite a number of people (in all 19 
people) on the topic of my study even though some of the questions could differ depending 
on what I wanted to find out. This prevented my research from being centered on a few 
                                                 
86 Interviewing can be defined as a discussion with the goal of gathering information that is relevant for the object 
of study. Berg (2012) p. 105. 
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people. I believe this helped strengthen the credibility and reliability of the answers I got 
from my respondents. 
 
I chose some of my interview respondents because their experiences were of direct 
relevance to the topic of my research. I thereby applied what some qualitative research 
methodologists describe as purposeful sampling. Purposeful sampling simply means that a 
researcher chooses a preferred category of people with the aim of obtaining profound 
“understanding of some phenomenon experienced by” these people.87 The interviews were 
mainly centered on the rule of law on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana, and 
social and family issues relating to it. 
 
2.4.1.2 My Different Categories of Respondents 
2.4.1.2.1 Interviews With People With Legal Expertise (Jurists) 
I interviewed a total of five lawyers (three women and two men), and a female magistrate 
who works at the Accra family tribunal. In addition to being lawyers, the three female 
lawyers were all women’s rights advocates working in different non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). They therefore overlap between the two categories, and there was 
no doubt that they had a clear interest in the topic of my research. I interviewed this 
category of people because they are all legal experts with a lot of knowledge about the 
matrimonial property rights of women in Ghana. I wanted to find out what people with 
legal background regard as the rule of law on property settlement upon divorce, given the 
fact that there are no substantive laws on the subject matter, and the fact that relevant case 
law pull in different directions. I also wanted to hear their views on the 2012 ruling of the 
Supreme Court in Mensah v. Mensah 
88
 and the role it would play in shaping the legal 
framework on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana. I found their answers essential to 
the questions discussed in chapters four and six. 
 
                                                 
87 Maykut (2004) p. 56. 
88 This case is presented in detail in chapter 3. 
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Having two male lawyers on my list of key informants was my way of dealing with my 
standing as a female law student and women´s rights advocate as a potential source of bias 
in my choice of respondents. This also dealt with the possible bias the female respondents 
with legal background could represent. My supposition that female lawyers are in a better 
position to give accounts of the realities on the field certainly influenced my choice of 
respondents. However, even though the focus of this thesis is on the matrimonial property 
rights of women, I believe that choosing only female respondents with legal background 
could have jeopardized the reliability of my data. I therefore deemed it very necessary to 
hear the viewpoints of people of the opposite sex who are not women’s rights activists. 
Interviewing both sexes of jurists also helped me gain insight into the extent to which 
knowledge about the legal issues pertaining to the marital property rights of women upon 
divorce is common amongst male jurists on one side and female jurists on the other.  
 
2.4.1.2.2 Interviews With Academicians With Different Educational Backgrounds 
I interviewed nine academicians; five men and four women. I interviewed this category of 
people because I wanted to hear their views on the Mensah v. Mensah (2012) ruling and 
social issues relating to women´s marital property rights upon divorce. In a way, this 
category of people can be regarded as an expert group. This is because even though they 
are neither women´s rights activists nor legal experts, they are good at criticizing policy. 
Hearing their views on the object of my study therefore contributed to enriching the 
findings of my data. Interviewing this category of people was also a way of ruling out any 
possible bias that could be justified with the fact that I only interviewed people with legal 
background because I am a law student. I observed that the opinions of this category of 
respondents differed from that of the jurists on certain themes. 
 
2.4.1.2.3 Interviews With Semi-Literates And Illiterates 
This category of respondents consisted of two men and two women who were all divorced. 
I interviewed them because I wanted to know how they divided their marital properties 
with their estranged spouses after they divorced. I also wanted to listen to their views on 
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the Mensah v. Mensah (2012) ruling. This category of respondents represents the ordinary 
Ghanaian. Thus, my categories of respondents cut across all sections of the society, thereby 
constituting variation in my respondent sample.   
 
I interviewed more educated people than uneducated people because they were “close at 
hand” due to the environment I lived in, and due to the fact that I spent a lot of time at the 
University of Ghana, Legon. I thereby used the convenient or availability sampling 
strategy, which implies that I chose respondents that “are easily accessible.”89 Whether or 
not interviewing more educated people than uneducated people could have affected the 
quality of my data is debatable. However, since the issue of matrimonial property rights 
upon divorce is relevant to both rich and poor, educated and uneducated alike, I do not 
believe the quality of my work was affected by the biased representation of respondents 
with regard to education.  
 
I also got to know and interview some of my respondents through earlier respondents. For 
instance after I had interviewed one women´s rights advocate, she gave me the contact 
details of another woman who is a prominent lawyer in family law and women’s rights, 
whom I later contacted and interviewed. This method of choosing respondents is in line 
with the snowball sampling strategy as outlined by Maykut. Snowball sampling can be 
defined as a sampling procedure where “one research participant or setting leads to 
another”.90  
 
Even though my interview respondents consist of a variety of people in the Ghanaian 
society, it must be clarified that my subjects only gave me an insight in the topic of my 
study. They are not a representative sample of the entire Ghanaian society. Thus, the 
possibility that a big-scale research with a larger sample of respondents could yield 
different results cannot be ruled out.  
                                                 
89 Berg (2012) pp. 50-51. 
90 Maykut (2004) p. 57. 
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2.4.1.3 The Kind of Interviews Used 
I made use of structured and unstructured interviews.
91
 This means that I had an interview 
guide with the questions I wanted to ask my respondents but I had different follow-up 
questions depending on whom I was interviewing and the kind of in-depth knowledge I 
acquired as I interviewed the person. By using this interview format, the flow of the 
discussions differed noticeably depending on the responses of each informant. 
 
2.4.1.4 The Location 
The research was mainly carried out in Accra, which is the capital of Ghana. I chose Accra 
because that is where most of my key informants were to be found. Also, written sources of 
information about Ghana law were easily accessible in Accra since Accra has many law 
libraries such as the Faculty of Law library of the University of Ghana, the Ghana Law 
School library, the GIMPA
92
 law library and the Supreme Court library. Because of this, 
conducting my research in Accra gave me easy access to most of the sources of data I 
needed.  
 
I always booked appointments with my respondents beforehand and told them about what 
the interview is about before I went to meet them. This way my respondents were able to 
prepare for the interviews beforehand so they could answer my questions efficiently. 
Depending on how much time the respondents had, the interviews lasted between 45 
minutes to one and a half hours. I interviewed all my respondents on a one-on-one and 
face-to-face basis. 
 
Majority of the interviews were carried out in the offices and homes of respondents whilst a 
few of them were carried out in libraries. An advantage of carrying out interviews in the 
offices of respondents was that some of the respondents gave me documents they felt 
would be helpful for my research. Such documents might not have been that easily 
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accessible if I had not interviewed them in their offices. Interviews that took place in the 
homes of respondents were often in the evenings, after the respondents had returned home 
from work and relaxed for a while. Interviewing people in libraries was not that interesting 
because, even though the interviews took place in the quite corners of the libraries, we had 
to keep our voices low in order not to disturb others.  
 
The language of communication during the interviews was English but I had to use the 
local language Twi
93
 when interviewing my illiterate and semi-literate respondents. My 
ability to speak both English and Twi fluently served as a very important tool for me 
because I did not need the help of a translator in order to communicate with any of my 
respondents. 
 
2.4.1.5 My Status As A Researcher: Insider and Outsider Roles 
My identity as a Ghanaian-Norwegian and the fact that I could fluently speak both English 
and a local language (Twi) contributed to creating harmony between me and my 
respondents. Many of them did not regard me as the rich European researcher who had 
come to study the less-privileged people of a developing country. They spoke at length on 
the questions I asked them, and I had the impression that they felt I understood them easily. 
An expression, which was frequently used whenever a respondent shared his or her 
opinions on a social phenomenon relevant to the topic of my research, was “ you know how 
things are in our culture”.  This can be said to be one of the advantages of conducting 
home-based research. 
 
2.4.1.6 Limitations Of The Empirical Research 
2.4.1.6.1 Power relations and imbalances 
                                                 
93 Twi is one of many local languages that are spoken in Ghana.  
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Some qualitative research methodologists argue that power imbalances can be experienced 
when researchers from the western world conduct research in the third world. 
94
 This can 
either be due to differences in financial and other resources or “perceived differences” 
between the researchers who might consider themselves “superior” to the participants, and 
the participants who might deem themselves “inferior ”to the researcher.95 Western 
researchers are therefore advised not to “reinforce any feelings of low self-esteem” 




In the course of my research, I observed that a remark I often got from the male 
respondents who did not like the idea that non-financial contribution (such as home-
making) should be accorded the same relevance as financial contribution during property 
settlement upon divorce was, “because you have lived abroad for a long time, you think 
just like them. That is European culture. We Africans are different.” Such comments give 
reason to question whether these male respondents shared their true views with me on the 
questions I asked them. This is because since they know that Europeans are different from 
Africans, it could be contended that they probably they gave me answers they knew I 
wanted to hear instead of expressing their actual opinions. Such comments also gave the 
impression that I was there to impose on them an aspect of western culture that is a threat 
to their culture.  
 
2.4.1.6.2 Lack of access to a specific category of respondents 
A category of respondents I had the aim of interviewing as I prepared for my research was 
members of parliament (MPs) and politicians. This is because one of the questions I sought 
answers to in the course of my research was why there are no substantive laws on property 
settlement upon divorce in Ghana despite the fact that the constitutions article 22 urges 
parliament to put such legislation in place. Since MPs and politicians are the people who 
make the laws, I believe they were the right people to give me the answer to this question. 
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However, during the time of my research, there were ongoing elections and getting a 
politician to interview proved very problematic. Thus, the answer to this question was 
sought from my category of respondents with legal background instead, even though none 
of them was an MP or a politician. 
 
2.4.1.6.3 Quartson v. Quartson (2012) 
Another limitation I experienced in the course of my research was that a new ruling, 
Quartson v. Quartson (2012) (see chapter 3) came out a day before I left Ghana. This ruling 
deviates from the ruling in Mensah v. Mensah (2012) around which many of my research 
questions were centered. I could not get a copy of the case because it was still unreported at 
the time of my departure. A friend sent me a copy of it through email after I returned to 
Norway.  Consequently, I did not get to interview people on this case. I however phoned 
some of my respondents upon my return to Norway, to here their views on the court´s 
ruling. 
 
Even though these limitations I faced may have had a negative impact on my primary data, 
I believe the positive aspects of my research outweigh the negative aspects. This is because 
amongst other things, there was variation in the choice of my respondents. I had two 
categories of respondents with expert opinion, and another category with first-hand 
experience of my object of study. This helps strengthen the validity and reliability of my 
data. 
 
2.4.1.7 Ethical Issues- Anonymity and confidentiality97 
Some of my respondents (mostly the male academicians, semi-literates and illiterates) 
asked that their names be kept anonymous due to various reasons. Also, there were some 
who did not permit me to record their interviews.  
                                                 
97 Anonymity refers to the duty of the researcher is to see to it that the identities of her respondents are kept safe if 
requested by them. The term confidentiality has a wider scope and refers to the fact that a researcher can be 
trusted with intimate information. Scheyvens (2003) p. 146 
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I had a general policy to respect the privacy concerns of all my respondents as I prepared 
for my research. Accordingly, before I interviewed anyone, I made sure I presented myself, 
who I am, where I am from and the purpose and objective of my research. I also asked for 
permission from the respondents before I recorded any interview. I informed them that any 
information I acquired from them would be kept with the strictest confidentiality, and that 
the information will be used solely for the purpose of the research. This is not something I 
just said, I also applied it in practice. By so doing, I believe I fulfilled my ethical 
obligations as a researcher.  
 
2.4.1.8 Storage, Transcriptions And Analysis Of Interviews 
The interviews were stored in different ways. I recorded some of them by using the 
recorder on my mobile phone. Where I was not allowed to record, I took notes from the 
interviews in a notebook. Other observations I made in the course of my research were also 
written down in this notebook right away.  
 
I transcribed the recorded interviews by replaying them and writing them down in word 
documents on my computer. Interview notes from my interview-notebook were also 
rewritten in word documents in order to keep them safe in the unlikely event of my 
notebook been misplaced. Having the interviews in text form on my computer made them 
easily accessible. 
 
In analyzing the data gathered from the interviews, I used the qualitative content analysis
98
 
approach as defined by various social research methodologists. Content analysis can be 
defined as “a careful, detailed systematic examination and interpretation of a particular 
                                                 
98 See Flick (2011) p. 136-139 and Berg (2012)  352-355. 
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body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases and meanings”.99 An 
important aspect of content analysis is “coding”. 100  
 
I started coding my data by first outlining the areas of the interviews that were important 
for answering my research questions.
 101 
 I did this by first defining what the main themes 
(the core questions I sought answers to) of the interviews were, and grouped them. I then 
matched the answers of each respondent to the various themes. This exercise helped me get 
rid of portions of the interviews that were less relevant,
102
 thereby making my data more 
transparent and orderly. By so doing I could also identify specific patterns of similarities 
and divergences in the responses of my informants. This helped me generate various 
theories from the interview data.
103
 These findings are presented in chapter 4 of the study. 
 
2.4.2 Secondary Data – Case Law And Other Sources Of Secondary Data 
2.4.2.1 Case Law 
Case law constitutes a major part of my secondary data. As already noted in chapter 1, I 
read and analyzed 31 cases on property settlement upon divorce. An analysis of the most 
important of these cases is given in chapter 3. I got access to these cases through my visits 
to the Supreme Court library, and the Ghana law school library where I found a book with 
a compilation of summaries of some of the major cases on property settlement upon 
divorce in Ghana.  
 
                                                 
99 Berg 2011: 349 
100 Birks (2011) p. 93 defines coding as ”an active process drawn from the real field of investigation, the 
researcher´s knowledge and experience” and existing concepts. Coding helps the researcher to  “identify 
conceptual reoccurrences and similarities in the patterns of the participants´ experiences. 
101 This is suggested by Flick (2011) p.136. 
102 Flick (2011) p. 136 describes this as summarizing content anlysis  
103 This is an aspect of the grounded theory approach as described by Glaser and Strauss.Grounded theory is 
defined by Glaser and Strauss as “the discovery of theory from data (which is) systematically obtained and 
analyzed…” Glaser (1967) p. 1. The grounded theory approach has many aspects but not all of these aspects are 
applied in this study. 
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2.4.2.1.1 Method Of Analysis Of Case Law 
Most of the cases that have served as sources of data for this dissertation are cases on 
property settlement upon divorce in Ghana. This is because they are directly relevant for 
my research. However, as will be observed in chapter 3, some of the cases presented are 
about property settlement upon the death of a spouse (the husband). This means that in its 
strictest sense, those cases fall within the domain of inheritance law. However, I used these 
cases because the statements by the courts in them have served as precedents for 
subsequent cases regarding property settlement upon divorce.  
When analyzing these cases, I focused on what the judges based their arguments on and 
how they reasoned in order to arrive at the conclusions they arrived at. Usually, when 
judges are deciding on a case, they use the formal written laws as a starting point and 
interpret these laws by retrieving arguments from other sources of law such as legislative 
instruments and earlier rulings. However, since there are no written statutes on property 
settlement upon divorce in Ghana, in most of the principal cases on the subject matter, the 
courts make reference to previous cases, as well as English case law.  I therefore had to 
read some of the cases the courts had referred to in order to interpret the conclusions of the 
courts in certain cases.  
2.4.3 Other Sources Of Secondary Data 
Other secondary data in the form of literature, and other written documents were amassed 
through my extensive use of various libraries in Accra. During my research in Oslo, I made 
immense use of the various libraries belonging to the University of Oslo. Literature on 
international human rights and international conventions served as good background 
reading and good sources of information.  
 
With regard to the interpretation of international conventions in chapter 5, cases from the 
European Human Rights Court (EHRC) served as invaluable sources of data. The CEDAW 
committee only gives comments on the shortcomings of member states instead of formally 
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declaring that the state has breached its obligations in the convention.
104
 Because of this, 
rulings from the European Human Rights Court on to which extent a country can be said to 
have violated its obligations in an international human rights convention served as a good 
substitute in this regard. 
 
2.5 Triangulation 
By using these different methods and sources of data, I applied what social research 
scientists refer to as triangulation.
 
The term triangulation signifies the examining of things 
from several perspectives in order to gain a better understanding of the object of a study.
 105
 
For instance, reading relevant case law on the object of my study served as good 
background knowledge for me when I was preparing the questions I wanted to ask my 
interview respondents. It also gave me an idea about the kind of relevant literature to search 
for. By gathering and analyzing relevant information through case law, interviews, and 
relevant literature, I acquired profound knowledge about various aspects of the realities on 
the field relating to the marital property rights of women upon divorce.  
 
In order to be able to cross-check the legitimacy of my discoveries, it was essential that I 
compared the data I gathered from the different sources. For instance, the social perception 
that a woman´s wealth has no “respect” in the Ghanaian society and that many women 
prefer to give their money to their husbands to acquire property (see chapter 4) is 
information I gathered by interviewing some respondents. I later read about this in 
literature on women´s rights
106
, and also in the facts of some relevant case law. By so 
doing, I could ascertain the validity of the information I acquired from the interviews by 




                                                 
104 Hellum (1999) p.117. 
105 Denscombe (2007) p. 134. 


























3 THE RULE OF LAW ON THE DIVISION OF MATRIMONIAL 
PROPERTY UPON DIVORCE IN GHANA PER TODAY 
 
3.1 Division of marital property according to the constitution 
The constitution has given parliament the authority to make laws that give spouses equal 
access to jointly acquired property during marriage, and an equitable share of such property 
upon divorce.  
 
Article 22 of the constitution states: 
 
“ (2) Parliament shall as soon as practicable after the coming into force of this constitution, 
enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses. 
(3) With a view to achieving the full realization of the rights referred to in clause (2) of this 
article 
(a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired  during marriage 
(b) assets which  are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably 
between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage.” 
 
It is important to draw attention to the fact that even though the Constitution is a major 
source of law in Ghana, a constitutional provision that addresses the legislature is, as a 
main rule, not to be directly applied by the courts in the judicial determination of the 
applicable law on a subject matter. Thus, in article 22, the Constitution is only telling 
parliament what needs to be done with regard to marital property settlement upon divorce. 
The Constitution is specifically asking parliament to make statutory laws on the subject 




 Until the relevant statutory laws are in place, the courts will only take into 
consideration the existing laws, see 3.2, and the rulings of the courts, see 3.3. 
 
However, according to the Supreme Court, the courts can to some extent rely on 
constitutional provisions that address the legislature “especially in cases where the inaction 
of Parliament results in the denial of justice and delay in the realization of constitutional 
rights.”108 Since article article 22 clause (2) talks about “regulating the property rights of 
spouses”, the courts have regarded these rights as “constitutional rights” in this sense. 
Accordingly, article 22 has been applied directly in some of the court´s rulings on property 
settlement upon divorce. It is therefore necessary to discuss the constitutional provisions on 
the subject matter as outlined in article 22 of the constitution. 
 
Worthy of attention is the fact that article 22 (3) litra a and litra b of the constitution 
address different aspects of marital property. Whilst 3 litra a addresses the rights of spouses 
with regard to matrimonial property during marriage, 3 litra b on the other hand addresses 
the rights of spouses to such property upon the dissolution of marriage.  3 a litra b is 
therefore the most important aspect of the constitution with regard to the topic of this study. 
 
The wording of article 3 (a) suggests that property that is jointly acquired during marriage 
should be the common property of spouses. Being the common property of spouses implies 
that both spouses shall have the same legal access to it and hence the same legal power to 
manage it (see definition of common property in 1.2.3). Having the same legal access to the 
property encompasses amongst other things, the same rights to use, sell or rent out the 
property. 
 
Article 3 (b) on the other hand, suggests that both spouses are to get an equitable share of 
jointly acquired property upon divorce. The wording of this article (and to some extent 
                                                 
107 Benson (2012) 
108 Quartson v. Quartson (2012) p. 11. This case was unreported at the time of my research so the numbering may 
of the pages are mine. 
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article 3 (a)) brings to the forefront the question of what is to be regarded as jointly 
acquired property. Put differently, in what ways should a property be acquired in order for 
it to qualify as a jointly acquired property? Another question article 3 (b) raises is the 
question of what is to be regarded as an equitable share of marital property. Since the 
Constitution does not give a further explanation of what is to be regarded as jointly 
acquired property and equitable share of property, the next question is whether the answers 
to these questions can be found in formal legislation.  
 
3.2 Division of marital property according to the matrimonial causes (MCA)  
 
As already noted, Ghana´s Matrimonial Causes Act (Act 367) delegates the responsibility 
of property settlement upon divorce to the Judiciary. According to section 20 of Act 367,  
 
“(1) The court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party such sum of 
money or convey to the other party such movable or immovable property as settlement of 
property rights or in lieu thereof, as part of financial provision as the court thinks just and 
equitable. 
 
(2) Payments or conveyances under this clause may be ordered to be made in gross or by 
installments”.  
 
According to the Supreme Court, this implies that in a divorce case, the division of marital 
property is ”left to the good sense and judgment of the court”.109  In other words, the court 
is to use its own wisdom to divide marital property between spouses in a way that it finds 
”just and equitable.” 
Hence, neither the constitution nor the law specifies which conditions that must be fulfilled 
in order for a property acquired in the course of marriage to be regarded as the jointly 
acquired property of both spouses. The answer to this question and the question of which 
                                                 
109 Achiampong v. Achiampong (1983) p. 1021. 
 41 
requirements that must be met in order for a specific share of jointly acquired property 
apportioned to a spouse to be regarded as equitable, must therefore be sought in relevant 
case law. 
 
The fact that the division of property is left to the wisdom of the courts does not necessarily 
mean that spouses do not have any legal protection with regard to matrimonial property 
upon divorce. This is because ”in exercising (their) discretion, the court would have to be 
guided by law; the discretion (in article 22 of Act 367) meant sound discretion guided by 
law, not vague, arbitrary or fanciful”.110  
 
Accordingly, the courts have in the course of the years at least developed “guidelines” that 
are to be followed when dividing marital property between estranged spouses. The question 
I endeavor to answer in this chapter is whether the courts have developed these guidelines 
into a binding rule of law that is applicable in the determination of ownership of property 
upon divorce. An analysis of the different principles that have been laid down by the courts 
in the course of the years is an essential exercise that must be undertaken in this respect. 
The goal is to draw a conclusion as to which of the principles that can be regarded as the 
rule of law pertaining to property settlement upon divorce per today.  
 
3.3 Principles for division of marital property laid down by the courts 
The Supreme Court has stated in its 2012 ruling in Mensah v. Mensah 
111
, that three 
different principles have been established regarding property settlement upon divorce in 
Ghana since 1959.  These are: 
- The Customary Law principle  
- The Substantial Contribution principle and 
- The Equality is Equity principle. 
                                                 
110 Ibid. 
111 In Mensah v. Mensah (2012), the supreme court presented a ”historical case law development” on property 
settlement upon divorce. See pages 11 to 18 of the ruling. This case was also unreported at the time of my 
research. Thus, the numbering of the pages are mine. 
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A fourth principle, which is the Jurisprudence of Equality principle, was established in  
Mensah v. Mensah (2012). These principles will be discussed one after the other in the 
following in my endeavor to find out the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for a 
marital property to be regarded as the jointly acquired property of spouses, and what is 
regarded as an equitable share of marital property upon divorce.  
 
3.3.1 The Customary Law Principle For Property Settlement Upon Divorce  
 The facts of the case of Quartey v. Martey (1959)
 112
 in which the courts established the 
customary law principle for property settlement upon divorce are as follows:  
H.A Martey and Evelyn Quartey were farmers who were married under customary law for 
25 years before Martey died in …... The land on which they farmed was owned by Martey 
who had inherited it upon the death of his father. The properties included a house, 70 cattle 
and cash amount of 1 305 pounds.
113
 Quartey who had assisted Martey during his lifetime 
and given him active assistance in all the jobs he did claimed shares in the properties they 
had jointly acquired during their marriage. The members of Martey´s family alleged that 
Quartey had no claim in any of the deceased´s property. 
The High Court ruled that Quartey did not have the right to a share in the property she had 
jointly acquired with her dead husband because: 
“…by customary law it is a domestic responsibility of a man's wife and children to assist 
him in the carrying out of the duties of his station in life, e.g. farming or business.  The 
proceeds of this joint effort of a man and his wife and/or children, and any property, which 
the man acquires, with such proceeds, are by customary law the individual property of the 
man.  It is not the joint property of the man and the wife and/or the children.  The right of 
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113From 1958 to 1965, the currency used in Ghana was the Ghanaian pound. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghanaian_pound. Accessed: 08.03.2013. 
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the wife and the children is a right to maintenance and support from the husband and 
father.”114 
Even though this case falls within the domain of inheritance law, the statement by the court 
has also served as a precedent for subsequent cases regarding property settlement upon 
divorce. 
From the statement of the court, it can be inferred that Customary Law imposes upon the 
woman a responsibility to assist her husband to acquire properties. However, her assistance 
does not give her the right to any share of these properties no matter how significant the 
assistance may be. Also, the fundamental rule is that a woman´s contribution to the 
acquisition of property does not count. In the view of the court, Quartey had a duty to assist 
her husband, and since she merely fulfilled her duty, it did not entitle her to any share in the 
properties.  
It could be argued that the court arrived at this conclusion because Martey owned the land. 
The question is whether there is reason to believe that he could have acquired the house, 
cattle and cash if his wife had not helped him to cultivate the land. Worthy of observation 
is that the courts did not dispute the fact that Quartey had rendered assistance to Martey in 
his farming business. The most important thing was that her contribution did not count. In 
the courts view, the long duration of the marriage and Quartey´s unpaid domestic work 
were of no relevance. Whether or not the courts would have declared Quartey sole owner 
of all the properties if she were the one who owned the land is also questionable.  
The ruling in Quartey v. Martey (1959) was followed in subsequent cases like Adom and 
Another v. Kwarley (1962), Gyamaah V. Buor (1962), and Ayer v. Kumordzie (1964). 
Cases after the year 1970 demonstrate a deviation from the customary law principle. 
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3.3.2 The Principle Of Substantial Financial Contribution 
The principle of substantial financial contribution was introduced in an obiter dictum in 
Gyamah v. Buor (1962). In the ratio decidendi of the case, the courts had followed the 
customary law principle, but in an obiter dictum The Supreme Court mentioned that 
“where the wife´s assistance takes the form of substantial financial contribution she will be 
entitled as of right to a share in the properties acquired by the husband.”(My italics)115 The 
question then is what is regarded as substantial financial contribution in this sense, and how 
much should the financial contribution be, in order to qualify as substantial? 
Many of the cases that will be used as guidelines to answer this question are cases from 
before the constitution came into force. However, according to articles 11 (1) litra d and 
article 11 (4) of the constitution, laws that existed before the constitution came into force 
are considered as part of the laws of Ghana. Accordingly, since case law is recognized as a 
source of law in Ghana, using cases that existed before the constitution can be said to be 
legitimate. 
 
3.3.2.1 Requirements for the establishment of substantial financial contribution 
A review of relevant case law shows that, for a spouse´s (in most cases the woman) 
contribution to the acquisition of marital property to be considered as a relevant basis for 
joint ownership of marital property upon divorce, : 
1. The spouse has to show proof of agreement or clear intention by the spouses to 
acquire the property jointly,  
2. secondly, her contribution has to be “financial”, and  
3. finally, in order to be regarded as a co-owner of the property, the financial 
contribtuion has to be “substantial” in relation to the contribution of the other 
spouse (the man). 
                                                 
115 A Casebook on the rights of women in Ghana (1959-2005) (2006) p. 66. 
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3.3.2.1.1 Agreement Or Clear Intention 
For a contribution to be regarded as contribution to the acquisition of marital property, it is 
necessary that the spouses have an agreement or a clear intention that the contribution 
should be regarded as such. This raises the question of what is considered agreement or 
clear intention.  In the 1974 case of Yeboah v. Yeboah, a wife who had acquired the plot of 
land on which the matrimonial house was built (but later transferred it into the name of her 
husband), supervised the building of the house and financed structural adjustments to it, 
claimed co-ownership of the house upon divorce. The court found that her contribution to 
the acquisition of the house could not be disregarded, and consequently ruled in her favor.  
It was held that ”the wife was a joint owner of the house with the husband because judging 
from the factors attending to the acquisition of the house and the conduct of the parties 
subsequent to the acquisition, it was clear that they intended to own the matrimonial home 
jointly (…) therefore, the wife would be held to be entitled to an equal share in the house 
with the husband”.116(My italics). 
 It was also held that “although customary law does not encourage joint ownership of 
property between persons who are not connected by blood, there is no positive rule of 
customary law which prohibits the acquisition of joint interests in property between 
persons not connected by blood. Where there was clear evidence that the parties intended to 
hold the property as joint tenants, the law would give effect to such an intention”.117 (My 
italics).  
From the ruling of the court, it can be deduced that an agreement does not necessarily have 
to be a formally written agreement or a verbal agreement. The conduct of the spouses and 
the factors attending to the acquisition of the property alone could indicate that an 
agreement had been reached. Consequently, the wife was declared co-owner of the house in 
the case of Yeboah v. Yeboah (1974) because even though there was no formal agreement 
                                                 
116 Yeboah v. Yeboah (1974) p. 72. 
117 A Casebook on the rights of women in Ghana (1959-2005) (2006) p. 71. 
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of co-ownership between her and her husband, there was a clear intention on their parts to 
own the property jointly. 
Thus, it can be concluded that according to the substantial financial contribution principle, 
one of the basis for co-ownership of marital property is that there should be an agreement 
between the spouses indicating that the property was meant to be their joint property. 
However, if the spouses had not entered into a clear agreement (which is often the case in 
Ghana because signing pre-nuptial agreements is not a common practice
118
), it is the duty 
of the courts to “ infer from their conduct in relation to the property what their common 
intention would have been had they put it into words before matrimonial differences arose 
between them.”119 (My italics). This inference is based on an overall assessment of all the 
circumstances pertaining to the acquisition of the property, and the court has to make a 
hypothetical assessment of what the parties would have intended if they had entered into an 
agreement before they acquired the property.  
3.3.2.1.2 The Amount Of Financial Contribution By Each Spouse 
Even though agreement between spouses or their common intention could give an 
indication of whether or not they intended to own a specific property together, there could 
be cases where there is neither a clear agreement between the spouses nor a clear intention 
on their parts to own a marital property jointly. This raises the question of how to find out 
whether or not the property was meant to be owned jointly.  
In the 1976 case of Abebreseh v. Kaah, Husband (H) and Wife (W) got married under 
customary law in 1933. They had ten children. H worked was a bookkeeper whilst W was a 
wealthy trader. When they decided to build their matrimonial home, they agreed that H 
                                                 
118 Minkah-Premoh (2012) 
119 See the English case of Ulrich v. Ulrich and Felton (1968) pp. 180-189, cited in Achiampong v. Achiampong 1983 
p.1029. This principle was later followed in Reindorf alias Sacker v. Reindorf (1974)  and Bentsi-Enchill v. Bentsi-
Enchill (1976).  
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should use his income to pay the children´s school fees, whilst W paid for all the other 
family expenses. H financed the cement used for the building, whilst W paid for the timber 
and they both shared the cost of the other building materials. W oversaw the building of the 
house in addition to helping to carry water to the building site together with their children. 
W who was an illiterate did not keep account of her contribution. The family moved into 
the house upon its completion in 1960. In 1969, H died without making a will. 
Upon H´s death, a family member of H (who had been appointed as H´s successor by H´s 
family) sold the house without the consent of W. W alleged that the sale was illegal 
because the house was a joint property of herself and the dead H and so the house could not 
have been sold without her consent. 
The court ruled that W was co-owner of the house because  “the rule of customary law that 
property acquired by a husband with the assistance of his wife and children became the 
property of the husband alone took its root from the fundamental principle that the wife and 
children were dependent upon the husband. That (is) not the case here. Furthermore, the 
size of the plaintiff´s contribution in this case (is) far more in excess of the assistance 
contemplated by the customary law”.120 Consequently, the sale of the house was declared 
illegal. (My italics) 
This gives an indication of how “substantial” a woman´s contribution should be in order to 
earn her co-ownership of marital property. Her contribution must exceed a contribution 
proportional to the man's contribution to the family economy. 
In the case of Achiampong v. Achiampong (1982-83),
121
 husband (H) and wife (W) got 
married under the Marriage Ordinance in 1951. After they got married, they moved into a 
two-bedroom house, which H had acquired a loan of 6, 400 ¢ to buy. W had told H before 
                                                 
120 A Casebook on the rights of women in Ghana (1959-2005) (2006) p. 80. 
121 Achiampong v. Achiampong (1982-83) GLR 1017  
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they got married that she had plans of buying her own house. She had saved 3, 360 ¢, 
which she intended to use for that purpose. H asked her to use the savings and her monthly 
salary of 165 ¢ for the upkeep of the family (the family consisted of the couple, two of H´s 
siblings and a househelp). They agreed that H should spend his salary of 150 ¢ to pay back 
the loan he used to buy the house. In addition, W had to sell her car because they needed 
the money to settle the cost of their wedding. After some years, they had to make 
extensions to the house since the house was too small to accommodate all the five people 
living in it. The extensions included the building of two new bedrooms, a storeroom, a 
garage, terrazzo floors in the whole house and the fitting of kitchen cabinets. W had to 
obtain a loan of 3,000 ¢ from her employers to finance these extensions and renovations. 
In 1972, H was appointed as a diplomat to China. W resigned from her work to follow H to 
China. In China, W worked as a part-time teacher from which she earned 120 ¢ a month, in 
addition to keeping the home and looking after their children. The marriage broke down 
when they returned to Ghana. 
W claimed joint ownership of their matrimonial home and all their household items whilst 
H claimed sole ownership of all the properties. The High Court gave a ”consent order” 
ordering H to pay W a sum of 4 000 ¢. The order did not specify what the money 
represented with regard to the division of property. Thus, W using article 20 (1) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act applied to the High Court again claiming joint ownership of the 
matrimonial home and all the household items. This time, a different judge ruled on the 
case and he ruled in favor of W.  
H, appealing to the Appeal Court argued that the High Court had misapplied the regulation 
in section 20 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act. He claimed that the court should asked 
him to give W a sum of money corresponding to her contribution to the acquisition of the 
properties instead of declaring her co-owner of the house.  
The appeal was dismissed. The Appeal Court ruling in favor of W held amongst other 
things that: 
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“ Quite apart from agreement, where during the marriage a spouse had induced the other to 
apply his or her income resources for the joint benefit of both of them, and where the 
earnings or resources in question could be regarded as substantial contribution and were so 
expended in the reasonable belief that he or she was acquiring a beneficial interest in 
properties purchased by the other spouse, as in the instant case, the court must on equitable 
principles hold that the spouse who bought the property held the beneficial interest therein 
as a trustee for himself or herself and the other spouse.”122 (My italics)  
Accordingly, the court concluded that “(…) the wife was entitled both in law and in equity 
to some beneficial interest in all the properties in dispute, absence of agreement 
notwithstanding. Having regard to the extent of the plaintiff´s contribution, that beneficial 
interest should be nothing less than a half-share”123 (My italics). 
The court also noted that section 20 (1) of Act 367 mandates the courts ”to make an order 
not only for the payment of monetary compensation (…) but also an order for the transfer 
of real or personal properties.”124  This statement by the court brings to the forefront the 
question of whether a woman´s financial contribution to the acquisition of marital property 
gives her the right to be co-owner of the property, or just the right to reimbursement during 
property settlement upon divorce. In this case, the court used her contribution as a basis to 
declare her co-owner of the property.  
The cases of Abebreseh v Kaah (1976) and Achiampong v. Achiampong (1983) illustrate 
that the courts did not regard the ruling in Martey v. Quartey (1959) as a blanket ruling. By 
using the principle of substantial financial contribution as a fundamental principle, a spouse 
was regarded as co-owner of matrimonial property first and foremost if the spouses had 
agreed on it. Secondly, the intention of the parties had to be taken into account if there was 
                                                 
122  Ibid p. 1031-1032. The court noted that this perception of trust was first established in English law in Falconer 
v. Falconer (1970 p. 1336) and Gissing v. Gissing (1971 p.904-905). 
123 Ibid p. 1033 
124 Ibid p. 1036. 
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no carefully formulated agreement. In the absence of agreement or clear intention, the 
financial contribution made by each of the spouses was taken into consideration. This 
implies that contributions made by a woman were not to be brushed aside if it is found to 
be substantial. If it was proved that the contribution was substantial, then the property was 
considered the joint property of the spouses, regarding each of them as a co-owner with an 
equal share of the property, with all the legal rights and obligations it involves, such as the 
right to administer and enjoy the property. 
Even though the principle of substantial financial contribution can be regarded as a positive 
development that seeks to give women some protection with regard to marital property 
upon divorce, it can be observed that the women in these two cases were women who 
worked outside the home and made more money than their husbands. Their contributions 
were extremely substantial. In addition, they had extra help in taking care of the home. For 
instance n Achiampong v. Ahciampong (1983), the couple had a house help whilst the 
couple in Abebreseh v. Kaah (1976), had ten children.
125
 Thus, it can be argued that the 
women in these cases had people who could take care of the unpaid domestic labor in the 
house like cleaning, cooking, etc. They could therefore work outside the homes in order to 
be able to contribute financially to the acquisition of the disputed properties.  
Thus the question that can be raised in this regard is whether it can be inferred from the 
substantial financial contribution principle as outlined in these cases that the customary law 
principle is to be applied also in situations where the woman´s contributions are in the form 
of non-financial contribution like unpaid domestic chores in the form of cooking and 
generally taking care of the home. 
                                                 
125 In Ghana, children who are around the age of 12 or older, have a duty to help with the domestic chores in the 
home. See Women And Law In West Africa. Gender Relations In The Family, A West African Perspective (2003) p. 15. 
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3.3.2.2 The burden of proof according to the principle of substantial financial 
contribution 
From the conclusion of the High Court in Yeboah v. Yeboah above, it can be observed that 
the court is not clear as to what the distinction between agreement and intent is, and this 
raises the question of the importance of intention. It is generally believed that once the 
parties to a contract have a common intention about the content of the contract, then there 
is an agreement. The legal fact that a formal written agreement is not an absolute criterion 
in order to establish that an agreement of co-ownership of property has been entered into, 
raises the question of who has the burden of proof of mutual agreement. This is because 
there must be evidence that the spouses actually intended to own the property together, if 
they did not put it into writing.  
The question of burden of proof was clarified in Achiampong v. Achiampong above where 
the Supreme Court held that “ (…) the burden of establishing an agreement is on the party 
alleging it; and that not every agreement entered into is a contract enforceable by law. (…) 
once the court finds (…) that the transaction was such that the parties must have intended it 
to be binding, the court must give effect to it, even though there was no carefully 
formulated agreement.” (My italics).  
From this, it can be inferred that if the woman can prove the existence of an agreement, she 
will also have to prove that this agreement was intended to be the binding legal document 
regarding ownership of the property. However, in the absence of proof, if an overall 
evaluation of issues pertaining to the acquisition of property indicated that her 
contributions were clearly substantial, then she would not be denied joint-ownership of the 
property.  
These cases also raise questions about the significance of the fact that most marital 
property (especially the matrimonial home) is often acquired or registered in the names of 
the husbands. As clarified in the court´s ruling in Acheampong v. Acheampong above, the 
formal ownership of property is not to be used as the deciding factor in declaring 
ownership of property. How easy it is to prove (especially in a place like Ghana where 
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property documents are often not registered in electronic databases) that the formal 
ownership of property does not depict its real ownership gives reason for concern. The 
reason why property is often registered in the names of the husbands, and the possible 
effects this practice could have on the implementation of future statutory laws on property 
settlement upon divorce are discussed in chapter 4.  
 
3.3.3 The Equality Is Equity-Principle126  
Even though the substantial financial contribution principle to the acquisition of marital 
property has been used to solve a lot of disputes of property settlement upon divorce in the 
course of the years, there could be situations where the agreement or intention of the 
spouses with regard to the acquisition of the property was not clear, and the contribution of 
one of the spouses could not be identified clearly. The question of how much substantial 
financial contribution each spouse has made to the property´s acquisition and what should 
be considered an equitable share to be given to each of the spouses would then arise.  
 
In England, the answers to these questions were first provided in the 1952 case of Rimmer 
v. Rimmer (1952) where it was decided that: “ In cases when it is clear that the beneficial 
interest in the matrimonial home, or in furniture, belongs to one or other, absolutely, or it is 
clear that they intended to hold it in definite shares, the court will give effect to their 
intention (….), but when it is not clear to whom the beneficial interest belongs, or in what 
proportions, then, in this matter as in others, equality is equity.”127 (My italics).   
 
It is noteworthy that Equity is equality is a “maxim of equity stating that if there are no 
reasons for any other basis of division of property, those entitled to it shall share it 
                                                 
126 The doctrine of equity was developed in English law by the Chancery with the purpose of redressing the 
injustices of the principles of common law, and dealing with its shortcomings. Equity means fairness. Equity 
examined the situation of both the petitioner and the respondent in a given case, and the party whose conduct was 
found to be ”inequitable” or whose demands would yield unjust solutions was denied remedy. Ingman (2011) p. 
322-323. 
127 Ibid p. 73 
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equally.”128 Thus, according to English law, the solution to a situation where spouses 
neither have a clear intention or agreement regarding a specific property, and their financial 
contributions also cannot be clearly identified, is that that property should be shared 
equally between the spouses, since this is what will lead to a fair (equitable) division of the 
property. 
 
The principles of equity were adopted in Ghana as part of the country´s colonial heritage, 
c.f articles 11 (1 ) litra e and article 11 (2) of the constitution. The question for discussion 
in this section is the extent to which the maxim of equality is equity is applicable in Ghana 
with regard to the marital property rights of spouses.  
In the case of Mensah v. Mensah (1998),
 129
 it was not disputed that husband (H) and wife 
(W) both had contributed to the acquisition of their matrimonial home. However, they had 
also made extensions to the house in the course of the marriage, which according to the 
Appeal Court was solely financed by W. Upon divorce, H and W each claimed sole 
ownership of the house. 
The High Court declared W sole owner of the house. H appealed to the Appeal Court 
where it was found that the house was the joint property of H and W but the extensions 
made to the house were the sole property of W. H appealed to the Supreme Court claiming 
that he was co-owner of the extensions made to the house as well. The Supreme Court 
unanimously held that H and W were co-owners with equal beneficial interests in both the 
house and the extensions. The court stated that:  
 
“ there was no evidence that the intention of the parties in acquiring the main house was 
any different from that in respect of the extension to the house; nor was there any evidence 
of a prior agreement between the parties that the extensions were to belong solely to one 
party. In such circumstances, the principle that property jointly acquired during marriage 
becomes joint property of the parties applies and such property should be shared equally on 
                                                 
128 http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095755518. (Accesed 12.10.2013). 
129 Mensah v. Mensah (1998-99) SCGLR 350 
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divorce; because the ordinary incidents of commerce have no effect on acquired property 
during marriage”. 130  
 
From this statement it can be deduced, that the burden of proof has been reversed. In the 
earlier cases the main rule was that marital property belonged to one of the spouses (in 
most cases the man) unless the other spouse (the woman) could show proof of co-
ownership. In this case on the other hand, the court made co-ownership of property the 
main rule, and sole-ownership the exception. This implies that it is the spouse claiming 
sole-ownership who has the burden of proof.  
  
The principle of equality is equity as established in Mensah v. Mensah (1998) was later 
affirmed in the case of Boafo v. Boafo (2005)
 131
 where a woman who had contributed 
financially to the acquisition of marital properties was not able to clearly identify her 
contributions. The court stated that “in cases where the evidence clearly points to a joint 
ownership, I found no inflexible rule stipulating that a spouse´s inability to clearly identify 
a contribution automatically disentitles her from a half share.” 132 and that “(…) the 
principle of equitable sharing of property jointly acquired by a married couple would 
ordinarily entail the equality principle, unless one spouse could prove separate 
proprietorship or agreement of a different proportion of ownership.”133 (My italics) 
This ruling indicates that the courts sought after what would give a fair division of marital 
property, by seeking flexible rules that would yield reasonable results. However, this fair 
division is subject to the contributions of both spouses (reference the use of the term 
“jointly acquired”) 
 
From the ruling of the courts in the cases of Mensah v. Mensah (1998) Boafo v. Boafo, it 
can be gathered that in situations where both the intention and agreement between the 
spouses with regard to the acquisition of marital property was unclear, and where their 
                                                 
130 Ibid p. 354-355. 
131 Boafo v. Boafo (2005-2006) SCGLR 705.  
132 Ibid p. 716 
133 Ibid p. 711. 
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financial contributions were also unclear, an equal division of the property was considered 
as what would yield equitable results.  
The cases of Mensah v. Mensah and Boafo v. Boafo, which were motivated by the English 
case of Rimmer v. Rimmer, represent a turning point in the rule of law on property 
settlement upon divorce in Ghana, where the courts had apparently developed a good and 
manageable rule of law on the subject matter, based on principles of fairness, with the main 
rule being that spouses are to share marital properties equally unless proof of a different 
proportion of ownership was presented. It was nevertheless mentioned in Boafo v. Boafo 
that section 20 of the Matrimonial Causes Act does not lay down any principles as 
guidelines regarding how marital property should be divided upon divorce because “the 
question of what is ’equitable,’ in essence, what is just and reasonable and accords with 
common sense and fair play, is a pure question of fact, dependent purely on the particular 
circumstances of each case. The proportions are, therefore, fixed in accordance with the 
equities of any given case.”134  
The Supreme Court has later interpreted this as a modification to the principle of equality is 
equity, and the statement has been described by the courts as the “locus classicus and a 
restatement of the law”135 on property settlement upon divorce. This is because, according 
to the courts, the ruling in Mensah v. Mensah (1998) gives the impression that the courts 
approve of the equal division of marital property in all cases. However, “even though an 
equal (…) distribution (is) usually a suitable solution to correct imbalances in property 
rights against women, (it) may not necessarily lead to a just and equitable distribution as 
the Constitution and Act 367 envisages.”136 Accordingly, the equality is equity principle 
cannot be regarded as the main rule. This is explained further in 3.3.5.  
Worthy of observation is that, in the case of Mensah v. Mensah (1998) where the principle 
of equality is equity was first introduced, it was the man in the case who was the weaker 
                                                 
134 Ibid 714. 
135 Mensah v. Mensah (2012) p. 10. 
136 Ibid p. 18. 
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party. Mensah v. Mensah (1998) is one of the few cases in which the contribution of the 
woman was apparently much more than that of the man, but the courts settled for an equal 
division instead of a division in proportion with the contribution of each spouse. 
Accordingly, the man benefitted from the reversed burden of proof. Yet, when this same 
rule of law was to be used to the advantage of the woman in the case of Boafo v. Boafo, a 
modification was made to the rule. This calls into question whether the woman in the case 
of Mensah v. Mensah would have been declared a co-owner of the extensions to the house 
with an equal beneficial interest if it were the man who had solely funded it. This has since 
not been clarified by the courts and is therefore subject to debate. 
 
3.3.4 The Jurisprudence Of Equity Principle (JEP) – Mensah V. Mensah (2012)137 
The principle of equality is equity as established in Mensah v. Mensah (1998) and Boafo v. 
Boafo (2005) has later been regarded by the courts as a ”far reaching” principle that needs 
to be improved upon. Consequently, a new principle called the Jurisprudence of Equality 
principle was introduced in Mensah v. Mensah (2012). 
In Mensah v. Mensah (2012), Stephen Mensah and Gladys Mensah both had no properties 
before they got married. Gladys was a petty trader whilst Stephen was a junior accounts 
officer. They had a farm on which they both worked during the weekends. They sold the 
proceeds of the farm, which Gladys used as capital for trading. She also got some money 
from her father, which she invested in her trade. Gradually, they built up their business, 
which was run by Gladys, and made a lot of profit. At the peak of their business, they were 
making between 150 to 300 million ¢ a month. The diligent Gladys bought plots of land on 
which she built several houses. They also bought a number of cars. Stephen was in charge 
of the accounts. He paid himself 500,000 ¢ every month and paid Gladys nothing.  
 
                                                 
137 This case is different from Mensah v. Mensah (1998) but the names are similar because the couples in both 
cases have similar surnames. 
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Upon divorce, Gladys claimed she had a 50 percent share in all the property they had 
acquired. The High court ruled in her favor based on the equality is equity principle. 
Stephen appealed to the Court of Appeal but the appeal was unanimously dismissed. He 
then appealed to the Supreme Court. (The statements made by the Supreme Court in this 
case are very important for the purpose of this study. Consequently, I present a lot of 
quotes from this ruling than any of the other rulings).  
 
The court, referring to article 22 (3) of the constitution remarked that ” it is a sad reflection 
that since 7th January 1993 when this 4th Republican Constitution came into force”138 
formal legislative guidelines that seek to give spouses equitable shares of marital property 
upon divorce have not yet been put in place.  
Thus it was held that: 
“ In view of the pride of place that our Constitution has in the sources of law in Ghana, 
reference article 11 (1) of the Constitution 1992, such fundamental philosophical principles 
which underpin distribution of marital property acquired during the subsistence of a 
marriage upon its dissolution should not be glossed over. This constitutional principle is 
similar to the emerging principle of “Jurisprudence of Equality” which is now applicable 
in issues concerning gender affairs.”139 ”Furthermore, the provisions spelt out in article 33 
(5)
140
 re-enforce the guarantee and protection of all the fundamental human rights 
contained in chapter 5 of the Constitution 1992 including the property rights of women, 
economic rights, cultural rights and practices and general fundamental freedoms and 
others.”141 
 
                                                 
138 Ibid p. 8 
139 Ibid p. 8. 
140 According to article 33 (5) of the constitution, ”The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded as excluding 
others not specifically mentioned which are considered to be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the 
freedom and dignity of man.” 
141 Ibid. 
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The court also observed that “Ghana is also a signatory to the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). (…) article 5 of 
CEDAW adds a key concept to international equal protection analysis; the need to 
eradicate customary and all other practices, which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. On the basis of the 
above conventions and treaties and drawing a linkage between them and the Constitution 
1992, it is our considered view that the time has indeed come for the integration of this 
principle of “Jurisprudence of Equality” into our rules of interpretation such that meaning 
will be given to the contents of the Constitution 1992, especially on the devolution of 
property to spouses after divorce. Using this principle as a guide, we are of the view that it 
is unconstitutional for the courts in Ghana to discriminate against women in particular 
whenever issues pertaining to distribution of property acquired during marriage come up 
during divorce. There should in all appropriate cases be sharing of property on equality 
basis.”142 
According to the Supreme Court, the jurisprudence of equity principle has been defined as 
“the application of international human rights treaties and laws to national and local 
domestic cases alleging discrimination and violence against women.”143 The court noted 
that the objective of this principle is to ensure that ” women will no longer be discriminated 
against and there will be equal application of laws to the determination of women issues in 
all aspects of social, legal and economic and cultural affairs.”144  
 
It was further observed that ” common sense, and principles of general fundamental 
human rights require that a person who is married to another, and performs various 
household chores for the other partner like keeping the home, washing and keeping the 
laundry generally clean, cooking and taking care of the partner’s catering needs as well as 
                                                 
142 Ibid p. 24-25. 
143 The court observed that this is the definition adopted by the International Association of Women Judges in their 
November, 2006 USAID Rule of Law Project in Jordan. 
144 Mensah v. Mensah (2012) p. 24. 
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those of visitors, raising up of the children in a congenial atmosphere and generally 
supervising the home such that the other partner, has a free hand to engage in economic 
activities must not be discriminated against in the distribution of properties acquired during 
the marriage when the marriage is dissolved. This is so because, it can safely be argued 
that, the acquisition of the properties was facilitated by the massive assistance that the other 
spouse derived from the other. In such circumstances, it will not only be inequitable, but 
also unconstitutional (…) to state that because of the principle of substantial contribution 
which had been the principle used to determine the distribution of marital property upon 
dissolution of marriage in the earlier cases decided by the law courts, then the spouse will 
be denied any share in marital property, when it is ascertained that he or she did not make 
any substantial contributions thereof. It was because of the inequalities in the older judicial 
decisions that we believe informed the Consultative Assembly to include article 22 in the 




Accordingly, it was concluded that ” even if this court had held that the petitioner had not 
made any substantial contributions to the acquisition of the matrimonial properties, it 
would still have come to the same conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to an equal share 
in the properties so acquired during the subsistence of the marriage. This is because this 
court recognizes the valuable contributions made by her in the marriage like the 
performance of household chores referred to supra, and the maintenance of a congenial 
domestic environment for the respondent to operate and acquire properties. Besides, the 
constitutional provisions in article 22(3) of the Constitution 1992, must be construed to 
achieve the desired results which the framers of the Constitution intended.”146 
 
(…) This court is of the considered view that the petitioner´s contribution even as a 
housewife, in maintaining the house and creating a congenial atmosphere for the 
                                                 
145 Ibid p. 9 
146 ibid p. 23 
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respondent to create the economic empire he has built are enough to earn for her an equal 
share in the marital properties on offer for distribution upon the decree of divorce.”147 
 
As already noted (see chapter 2), this ruling is at the core of my research and it formed the 
basis for my interview questions during my research. The court´s decision can be said to be 
quite revolutionary, and very good for the marital property rights of women in Ghana. First 
of all, by introducing the Jurisprudence of Equity Principle, it regards woman´s right to an 
equal share in marital property as a fundamental human right which women are entitled to, 
irrespective of the amount of financial contribution they make to the acquisition of the 
properties. Secondly, it accords household chores the same weight as financial 
contribution. Thus, it disregards the principle of substantial financial contribution as a 
requirement for an equal share in marital property. Thus, the decision appears to lay down 
the same principle that in Norway was established in the Norwegian Housewife judgment 
(Husmordommen) of 1975
148
. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of this case)  
 
3.3.4.1 The Supreme Court´s deviation from the JEP principle in Quartson v. 
Quartson (2012) 
 
A day before I left Ghana after conducting my research, I was informed that a new ruling, 
Quartson v. Quartson (2012) had come out and that it deviates from that of Mensah v. 
Mensah (2012).  
In this case, husband (H) and wife (W) were married for 25 years. H was a seafarer and 
was therefore away for many years. During these years, he gave a lot of money to W to 
build their matrimonial house. W oversaw the building of the house alone from the 
foundation level until the house was perfectly built. For a period, H was imprisoned in 
Liverpool and it was W who took on the responsibility of taking care of their three 
                                                 
147 Ibid p.25. 
148 Rt. 1975 p. 220. This case is discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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children. Upon divorce, W claimed co-ownership of the matrimonial house whilst H 
claimed sole-ownership. W did not dispute the fact that H alone financed the matrimonial 
home.  
The High court awarded W an amount of ¢ 35 000 and divided their assets not on an equal 
basis. The court also ordered her to leave the matrimonial home within 30 days. W made an 
appeal to the Appeal Court, who dismissed the appeal, but awarded her ¢ 50 000 as 
financial settlement. She then appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that her 
contribution to the acquisition of the matrimonial home entitled her to an equal share in it.  
The Supreme Court
149
 held that:  
“The decision in Gladys Mensah v. Stephen Mensah (…) is not to be taken as a blanket 
ruling that affords spouses unwarranted access to property when it is clear on the evidence 
that they are not so entitled. Its application and effect will continue to be shaped and 
defined to cater for the specifics of each case. The ruling, as we see it, should be applied on 
a case-by-case basis, with the view to achieving equality in the sharing of marital property. 
Consequently, the facts of each case would determine the extent to which the judgment 
applies.”150 
From the statement of the court, it can be inferred that the facts and equities of each case 
are to be assessed independently, thereby giving judges a lot of freedom when deciding on 
such cases, as opposed to the ruling in Mensah v. Mensah (2012) which laid down a lot of 




It was further held by the Supreme Court in Quartson v. Quartson (…) ”that on the strength 
of Gladys Mensah v. Stephen Mensah (…) the wife would be entitled on a share of the 
                                                 
149 The Supreme Court judges in this case were different from those who presided over the case of Mensah v. 
Mensah (2012) 
150 Quartson v. Quartson (2012) p. 13. 
151 Ibid p. 16 
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value of the matrimonial home. The evidence is abundantly clear that she performed her 
supervisory tasks over the building of the house satisfactorily. Even though she was a 
housewife, she single-handedly took charge of the household when her husband, the 
appellant, was incarcerated for years in Liverpool. We would agree with the reasoning in 
Gladys Mensah v. Stephen Mensah supra that the inability to adequately quantify the 
appellant’s wifely assistance towards the construction and upkeep of the matrimonial home 
does not in itself bar her from an equitable sharing of the matrimonial property.”  
This could mean that the courts meant that in the absence of financial contributions, a wife 
should be entitled to a share of community property (reference the expression a value of a 
share of the matrimonial home). Thus, it was stipulated that the case of Mensah v. Mensah 
(2012) did not establish the right of a woman to an equal share in community property, but 
to a certain percentage of it.  
Consequently, it was concluded  “(…) it must be noted that this court has taken into 
account the equality principle laid down in Mensah v. Mensah and Boafo v. Boafo, supra. 
However, as (…) held in Boafo v. Boafo supra, the equality principle may be waived if in 
the circumstances of a particular case, the equities of the case would demand otherwise. 
We think that the equities of this particular case do not call for a half and half sharing of the 
marital home”.152 
Based on this, W was not considered as a co-owner of the house, but she was awarded a 
financial settlement of ¢ 65 000 ($ 29 000). 
As already noted, the Supreme Court in Ghana is not bound by its previous decisions, c.f. 
article 129 (2) and (3) of the constitution. In my opinion, the Supreme Court in this case did 
not follow the principle it had laid down in Mensah v. Mensah 2012 that even if the woman 
had not contributed financially to the acquisition of matrimonial properties, the court would 
still have concluded that she is entitled to an equal share in the properties because the court 
recognizes the valuable contributions made by her in the marriage like the performance of 
                                                 
152 Ibid p. 14. 
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household chores, etc. It is therefore necessary to make a comparison of the case of Mensah 
v. Mensah (2012) and Quartson v. Quartson (2012) in an attempt to find out why the court 
deviated from its ruling in Mensah v. Mensah (2012). 
 
3.3.4.2 Comparison Of Mensah V. Mensah (2012) And Quartson V. Quartson 
(2012) 
In Mensah v. Mensah (2012), it was found that the woman had contributed substantially 
because the man worked for the government during the day whilst the woman was the one 
who managed their businesses and supervised the building of their houses. Therefore the 
properties they acquired in the course of the marriage were acquired with monies, which 
the man had earned from his work, and monies, which the wife had acquired from the 
business. In Quartson and Quartson (2012) on the other hand, the woman had not 
contributed in monetary terms to the building of the house. The husband however was a 
seafarer and was hardly at home. Therefore the woman solely took care of the kids in 
addition to building their matrimonial home, which was solely funded by the husband.  
Thus the main difference between the facts of these two cases is that the woman in Mensah 
v. Mensah made substantial financial contributions to the acquisition of properties in 
addition to performing unpaid domestic chores like cooking, cleaning, etc, whilst the 
woman in Quartson v. Quartson did not make any financial contributions towards the 
acquisition of the disputed property. All her contributions were non-financial. 
It is not mentioned in Mensah v. Mensah (2012) whether the couple had children. 
However, the court clearly stated that even if the woman had not contributed financially to 
the acquisition of the matrimonial properties by trading and running the family business, 
her contribution alone as a housewife, keeping the home clean and creating a congenial 
environment for the man to work and make monies was enough to give her an equal share 
in the matrimonial property. In Quartson v. Quartson on the other hand, it is pointed out 
that “the fact that a wife has served her husband dutifully, faithfully and responsibly during 
marriage does not by itself entitle her to a share in the property acquired by the husband”.  
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In Mensah v. Mensah, it is stated clearly that the woman had contributed directly by 
performing household chores and that this indirect contribution is what “facilitated the 
acquisition of properties by the” husband.153 This implies that there was a direct causal 
connection between the indirect contributions of the wife and the properties acquired by the 
husband because the contributions of a wife gave the husband “ a free hand to engage in 
economic activities”. 154 
 The court did not lay much emphasis on the woman´s household chores in Quartson v. 
Quartson. It can be argued that since the husband in Quartson v. Quartson was hardly at 
home, whether or not the woman created a congenial atmosphere or cleaned the 
matrimonial home was irrelevant for him. Nonetheless, the couple had three children who 
this woman single-handedly took care of. The question then is whether “raising up of the 
children in a congenial atmosphere and generally supervising the home such that the 
(husband had) a free hand to engage in economic activities”155 whilst staying abroad, was 
not enough housework for the woman to gain an equal share in the matrimonial home she 
built alone with the husband´s money. In my opinion, there is a more direct causal 
connection between these chores the woman in Quartson v. Quartson performed and the 
amount of time she freed up for her husband, than there is in the case of Mensah v. 
Mensah.  
Thus, the fact that these household chores were not accorded the weight that it was meant 
to be accorded in light of Mensah v. Mensah indicates that the courts deviated from this 
principle. 
The question is whether the statement the court made in Mensah v. Mensah that household 
chores alone would have entitled the petitioner to an equal share of property, was a 
statement they made because they knew the woman´s substantial contribution was enough 
to acquire her an equal share in the property anyway, irrespective of the role she had played 
as a housewife. This argument can be fortified with the fact that the court laid emphasis on 
                                                 
153 Mensah v. Mensah (2012) p. 9. 
154Ibid  
155 Ibid  
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the accounts of witnesses, which indicated that she was not a lazy housewife, but had 
actually contributed financially to the acquisition of the disputed properties.  
The statement by the court in Quartson v. Quartson (2012) that Mensah v. Mensah (2012) 
is not a “blanket ruling, which gives unwarranted access to property” indicates that a 
woman must still show proof of substantial financial contribution in order to get a share in 
matrimonial property upon divorce. In other words a woman must contribute in other ways 
apart from “raising up of the children in a congenial atmosphere and generally supervising 
the home such that the (husband) has a free hand to engage in economic activities” in order 
to get a share in marital property upon divorce.  
Thus, this if the same Supreme Court (though composed of different judges) that based its 
arguments mainly on the Jurisprudence of Equity principle and the Constitution 1992 in 
order to equally divide matrimonial property in Mensah v. Mensah (2012), bases its final 
argument on the principles of substantial financial contribution in order to waive equal 
division of matrimonial property in another case, then it indicates that the courts are not 
ready to value indirect contribution in the form of home-making as a form of contribution 
to the acquisition of marital property.  
From the facts of the case of Mensah v. Mensah, it is obvious that the contribution of the 
woman extensively exceeded the contribution of the man. The question is whether the 
courts would have declared the woman co-owner of all the properties if she were the one 
who had a government job whilst her husband run the businesses. I believe that the woman 
in Mensah v. Mensah should have been awarded a larger share of the properties than 50 % 
since her contributions far exceeded that of the husband.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In light of the ruling in Mensah v. Mensah 2012 and Quartson v. Quartson 2012, the 
current rule of law on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana can be described as 
follows: 
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Where a spouse has made substantial financial contribution to the acquisition of marital 
property, that spouse will be entitled to an equal share of the property upon divorce.  The 
spouse will become a co-owner of the property with all the legal rights and obligations it 
entails. However, a home-making spouse (in most cases the woman) who has contributed 
to the acquisition of marital property solely with indirect contributions such as taking care 
of the home and performing unpaid domestic duties, will get some compensation 
depending on how diligently she carried out these domestic duties. In other words, 
performing household chores and contributing indirectly alone is not enough to give the 
woman co-ownership of marital property with any percentage.  
This further implies that Ghana still relies on the principle of substantial financial 
contribution, which was established in the 1970s. Accordingly, what is to be regarded as 
jointly acquired property, and equitable share of marital property according to article 22 (3) 
of the constitution, will depend on the facts of each case and on the contribution of each of 
the spouses. Even though the courts have made efforts to establish new principles, it is still 
quite unclear what the rule of law on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana is per 
today. What can probably be said for sure is that the customary law principle is no longer 
the fundamental principle. According to the courts, it “should be regarded as outmoded,”156 
and ”cannot be allowed to stand, in this twenty-first century world.”157 Instead, women can 
be entitled to a share of marital property if and only if they have contributed significantly to 
its acquisition.  Whether or not this current rule of law is what article 22 (3) b of the 
constitution urges parliament to codify in substantive legislation can therefore not be said 
for certain considering the fact that the constitution urges parliament to make legislation 
that will give both men and women an equal share of marital property.  
 
The extent to which this current rule of law effectively secures the matrimonial property 
rights of women in Ghana warrants further investigation, and is therefore the topic of 
discussion in the next chapter. This is because it is necessary to find out whether leaving 
                                                 
156 See Bosfo v. Boafo (2005) p. 711. 
157 Quartson v. Quartson (2012) p.10. 
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the question of the division of marital property to the discretion of the courts is the best 
way to ensure the effective protection of women´s matrimonial property interests, or 
whether there should be legislative guidelines along which the courts shall exercise their 
judgment in order to ensure the effective protection and advancement of women with 
regard to marital property upon divorce. 
 
In the next chapter, I discuss certain conditions in the Ghanaian society which indicate that 
judge-made non-statutory laws may not be sufficient to ensure the effective protection of 
the property rights of women in Ghana, and that there might be the need for written statutes 
in order to ensure this effective protection, I this is found to be the case, it will serve as the 
relevant premises for the discussion in chapter 5 on the extent to which the lack of formal 
legislation on property rights upon divorce constitutes a breach of Ghana´s human rights 













4 CAN JUDGE-MADE NON-STATUTORY LAWS ENSURE 
ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN UPON DIVORCE IN GHANA?  
 
 
”…to alter the position of woman at the root is possible if all the conditions of social, 
family and domestic existence are altered.”- Leon Trotsky 158 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Findings of my research indicate that the common knowledge amongst Ghanaians is that a 
lot of women suffer injustice during the division of matrimonial property upon divorce. 
Ghanaian jurists were however not convinced that the ruling in Mensah v. Mensah (2012) 
is a ruling that will better the matrimonial property rights of women upon divorce. They 
believe that the result might differ from case to case and that the substantial contribution 
principle (see chapter 3) is still the main rule. This view was confirmed in Quartson v. 
Quartson (2012) where the courts acknowleged that the facts of each case would determine 
the extent to which the judgment in Mensah v. Mensah (2012) will apply. 
 
On this account, and expecially with the rulings in Quartson v. Quartson the courts and 
other authorities that decide on cases of property settlement upon divorce have been given 
a legal basis to depart from the principles in the decision of the Supreme Court in Mensah 
v. Mensah (2012).  One consequence of this is that women have no way of clearly 
predicting their legal position since it all comes down to the discretion of the courts in the 
particular case. The question is whether this situation where judge-made non-statutory laws 
govern the devolution of marital property upon divorce, can ensure the adequate protection 
of the matrimonial property rights of women upon divorce. 
 
                                                 
158 Women and the family (1973) p.45 cited in Munoz (2000). 
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In this chapter I discuss certain conditions in the Ghanaian society which indicate that 
judge-made non-statutory laws may not be able to provide adequate protection of the 
marital property rights of women upon divorce and that these rights may have to be 
provided in written statutes to give women a satisfactory legal basis that will protect 
guarantee their marital property rights. In chapter 5 the question of whether or not Ghana is 
obliged by the CEDAW to enact legislation on property rights of spouses upon divorce in 
























4.2 Conditions In The Ghanaian Society Which Indicate That Formal 
Statutory Laws May Ensure A Better Protection Of The Marital Property 
Rights Of Women Than Judge-Made Non-Statutory Laws 
 
4.2.1 The Matrilineal And The Patrilineal Family Systems 
Even though there is no clear rule of customary law stating that people not related by blood 
are not to acquire properties together, Ghanaian customary law does not support the joint 
acquisition of properties by people not related by blood.
159
 Thus according to customary 
law, it is not advisable for a man to jointly acquire property, (like building a house) 
together with his wife.
160
 A man is supposed to acquire property with his maternal siblings 
if he belongs to the matrilineal family system, and with his paternal siblings if he belongs 
to the patrilineal system. This is because they are the people with whom he is related by 
blood through a common ancestor, (see chapter 1). The same applies to the wife. Because 
of this, it is very common that in situations where the spouses have acquired a lot of 
property, the families on each side get involved in the division of property upon divorce, 
(or upon the death of one of the spouses) to help their kinsman fight for his/her share of the 
property. Consequently, a spouse who does not have strong family members to fight for 
him/her (in most cases the woman) ends up leaving the matrimonial home with nothing.  
 
A view many of my male respondents expressed regarding the court´s decision in Mensah 
v. Mensah (2012) is that if the court´s decision that household chores should be accorded 
the same weight as financial contribution is made law, it will encourage many men to 
acquire properties in the names of their family members (maternal or paternal) depending 
on which family system they belong to.  
 
                                                 
159 See chapter 1 and the observations of the courts in Yeboah v. Yeboah (1974) and Abebreseh v. Kaah (1976).  
160 Takyi (2012) 
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“This will ensure that the property stays in the family and does not go to a stranger161 in 
case of divorce,” says Dr. Hakeem Ofosu, a medical doctor (28).  
 
Another respondent (anonymous male) (42) said “I am very much aggrieved by the court´s 
decision in this case. So now I have to register all my properties in the name of my brothers 
to be on the safer side. How can you say that because my wife has done her duty as a 
woman in the course of our marriage, she should be given half of everything I have made 
in the course of the marriage? No, that won´t work”. 
 
Such clear remarks from people in my opinion strongly indicate that even though people´s 
perceptions may have changed to a certain extent today with respect to the traditional 
perception of family in Ghana due to modernization and urbanization, the belief in 
matrilineal and patrilineal family systems is so deeply rooted in many Ghanaians that 
people will find a way around the ruling in Mensah v. Mensah in order to protect the 
interests of people they regard as family, but also that they would find a way around future 
legislation on the topic.  
 
Getting the kind of remark I got from a young academician like Dr. Ofosu was a bit 
surprising since I was expecting the views of people of younger generation to differ from 
that of the older generation. This indicates that it may be necessary to have thoroughly 
legislation on property settlement upon divorce. Such legislation should be legislation that 
takes into account the pro forma situations where men may acquire properties in the names 
of their siblings in order to keep it from division upon divorce. Thus, such legislation 
should give women the right to an equal share of all property acquired by the man in the 
course of marriage even if they are in the names of other family members. This is because, 
findings of my empirical data indicate that modernization may not lead to any improvement 
in the position of women when the next generation of men are put in positions that can 
influence the devolution of marital property upon divorce. 
 
                                                 
161 Stranger here refers to the wife since she is regarded as a stranger in relation to the husband and his kinsmen. 
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4.2.2 The Plurality Of Marital Forms In Ghana 
The three different ways by which marriage can be contracted and dissolved in Ghana, 
presented in 1.5.1 may also imply that it is necessary to put in place a formal statutory law 
on property settlement upon divorce. As already observed (see chapter 1) “there is nothing 
called “division of assets” after divorce in customary marriages. Just as they are celebrated 
at home, they are also dissolved at home. The man just has to give some drinks to the 
woman´s family and that is it. The woman is not entitled to any share of the property. This 
applies to the Islamic marriages as well.”162 Many of my respondents expressed this same 
view.  
 
Putting in place clear statutory laws on women´s matrimonial property rights may 
encourage many women in customary marriages and Islamic marriages to pursue their 
share of marital property when they know they have a clear legal basis for it.  
 
4.2.3 Challenges With Regard To Polygamy.  
As already noted, (see chapter 1) polygamy is allowed in customary and Islamic marriages. 
Even with the Ordinance Marriage where polygamy is forbidden according to the criminal 
offences act, the law is not obeyed and many Ghanaian women believe that the law cannot 
protect their marriages from becoming polygamous. This is because the law is “disregarded 
with impunity”.163 
 
One of my respondents, Ms. Beatrice Brew, a student (27) remarked: 
 
 “Even though bigamy is a crime for those married under the ordinance, none of the wives 
would like to report it to the authorities for the man to be sanctioned. If she does so and the 
man is arrested, who will take care of her? Who will pay her children´s school fees? That is 
why polygamy is so prevalent in Ghana even in Ordinance Marriages.”  
                                                 
162 Takyi (2012) 
163 Svanikier  (1997) p. 82. 
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At the time of my research, there were no discussions or deliberations on the abolishment 
of the practice of polygamy in Ghana. “It is part of our culture,” says Ms. Edna Kuma, 
executive director of the African Women´s Lawyers Association. She is of the view that 
polygamy should be abolished but she also recognizes the fact that it will not be an easy 
task. She noted that it would even be more difficult in the Muslim communities, “because, 
for them it is not only part of their culture, but also part of their religious belief”.  
 
Thus, it may be necessary to make legislation on division of marital property that cuts 
across all the three marital forms, and takes into consideration the situation of women in 
polygamous marriages. If the country is not ready to abolish polygamy, then it may have to 
make provisions in its legislation to protect the rights of women that are in it. 
 
4.2.4 Social Norms 
Social norms such as the obligation of children to take care of their parents in their old age 
could also suggest the need for formal legislation on property settlement upon divorce. This 
is because the main purpose of marriage in the Ghanaian society is to have children.
164
 
Having children helps to strengthen the marriage and children have a duty to take care of 
their parents when they grow old.  
 
A female respondent (anonymous) (age 37) said, “My main worry after I got divorced was 
the education of my children. How was I going to pay for their school fees? You know 
school fees are very expensive these days. But when he (referring to her ex-husband) 
agreed to pay their fees, I was relieved. That was the most important thing for me. I really 
do not care about property as long as the future of my children is secured.” 
 
According to magistrate Gandedzie,  
 
                                                 
164 Women And Law In West Africa. Gender Relations In The Family, A West African Perspective (2003) p.27. 
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“Most women say that as long as the man will take care of the children and pay their school 
fees to ensure they get good education and a good future, they know their children will 
come back and take care of them in future. So these women do not have any interest in 
fighting for matrimonial property. They even fear to take it to court. There are cases of 
situations where after the man´s death the children go to bring the woman back to the 
house. Most of the women who bring their cases to the courts and family tribunals do so 
when the man refuses to take care of the children or throws the children out of the house. 
They never ask about the division of assets. Some of them do not even know that they have 
the right to demand a share in the matrimonial property. All they care about is their 
children.”  
 
This indicates that many women care less about matrimonial property upon divorce 
because upon the dissolution of marriage, the welfare of their children is the most 
important thing for them.  
Another common perception in the Ghanaian society is that women who earn more than 
their husbands or who are wealthier than their husbands do not respect them.
165
 Because of 
this,  “in the Ghanaian society, a woman´s money has no respect no matter how wealthy 
she is. A woman who is wealthier than her husband will be called all sorts of names by the 
society. So even if a married woman is wealthier than her husband, she would like to give 
her wealth to her husband, in order to give the impression that he is the owner of the 
wealth. That way both she and the husband get respect”, says Ms. Harriet Takyi. 
 
This statement by Ms. Takyi can be seen in some of the cases presented in this chapter, 
such as the case of Yeboah v. Yeboah (1where the woman transferred the plot of land she 
had acquired into the name of her husband) and the case of Mensah v. Mensah (2012) 
where all the properties were acquired in the name of the husband even though both 
spouses had contributed to its acquisition.  This suggests that future legislation on property 
settlement upon divorce should be formulated in way that takes this social phenomenon 
                                                 
165  Ibid p.21. 
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into consideration, so women do not lose financially because they have given their money 
to men to acquire properties.  
 
Magistrate Gandedzie who cited the example of her sister also made this same point. She 
said “I have a sister who got a lot of money and wanted to buy a plot of land. Instead of 
buying it herself, she gave the money to her husband to buy the land. When the man bought 
the land, he registered it in his own name, without stating his wife as co-owner. Now, in the 
unlikely event of a divorce, how is my sister going to prove that the land actually belongs 
to her? There are a lot of women facing a similar situation here in Ghana because of our 
social norms. In such a situation, the men do not care when their wives want to divorce 
them. This is because they know the court works with evidence.” 
 
 
Such social beliefs and norms indicate that clear legislation on property settlement with 
rules of evidence that takes such social realities into consideration is needed to ensure the 
effective protection of the marital property rights of spouses. Such legislation may help 
many women leave oppressive marriages and make them economically capable of taking 
care of their children so they may not have to be dependent on their alienated husbands for 
the upkeep of their children upon divorce.  
 
4.2.5 Religion 
In Ghana religion plays an important role in the lives of the majority of the people. A 
consensus from the year 2000, shows that 69 % of the population was Christians and 16 % 




One of my respondents Mr. Samuel Antwi (30) observed that, 
 
                                                 
166Europa Regional Surveys of the World. Africa South of the Sahara 2012 (2012) p. 584 
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“Many Ghanaians especially the women, are ultra-religious and have the tendency to 
ascribe all their troubles to supernatural forces. So, rather than using the justice system, 
most women prefer to “leave everything to God” to judge the case in heaven. Taking one´s 
own spouse to court in relation to the division of marital property may also attract negative 
comments from fellow worshippers, or might be contrary to “the word of God”.  This being 
the case, many would prefer to leave everything to God.” 
 
If there is clear legislation on what each spouse is entitled to upon divorce, it may be easier 
for people to understand that there is nothing negative about claiming what rightfully 
belongs to oneself. People might not even have to access the legal system in the first place 
if they already know what they are entitled to, based on the written statutory laws.  
 
 
4.2.6 Educational Barriers And The Lack Of Access To Information. 
English is the formal language used in Ghana. However, a 2008 survey by the Ghana 
Statistical Services indicates that only 51 percent of adults in Ghana can read and write in 
English.
167
 This means that about 49.9 % of the population can’t read or write in Ghana´s 
official language. Often, boys are prioritized when a cannot afford the school fees for all 
the children, while the girls are often obliged to stay at home and help their mothers in their 
chores learn a trade.
168
 This means that a lot of Ghanaian women have little or no formal 
education. The report states that 6 out of every 10 men are literates whilst only 4 out of 
every 10 women are literates.
169
 Consequently, the ability of women to access information 
is more limited than that of men. This can easily be a hindrance to the enjoyment of their 
rights because in general they will be the last group of people to become aware of the 
passing of any law that seeks to protect the rights of women.
170
  The question then is how 
                                                 
167 Ghana Living Standards Survey (2008) p. 14. 
168 Takyi (2012) 
169 Ibid. 
170 Armstrong (1987) p. viii. 
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women who have little or no education can be expected to read and understand legal court 
cases in order to find out what their rights pertaining to marital property are. 
 
Findings of my research show that apart from people with legal background, many people 
are not even aware that there are no statutory laws on the property rights of spouses upon 
divorce. None of my respondents without legal background, no matter how highly educated 
they were, was aware of this. Each one of them expressed surprise when I told them about 
it. They would then ask; “but what about the intestate succession law?”. I then had to 
explain to them that the intestate succession law only applies if the marriage is dissolved by 
the death of a spouse, not when the marriage is dissolved by divorce. It can be argued that 
people are aware of the intestate succession law because it is codified in the laws of Ghana. 
Accordingly codifying the law on property settlement upon divorce could help to make the 
matrimonial property rights of women better known and encourage women to pursue these 
rights upon divorce.  
 
4.2.7 Lack Of Access To, And Unavailability Of Legal Information 
Out of my 19 respondents of which 79 % had higher education, only my respondents with 
legal background knew about the Mensah v. Mensah (2012) case. This means that only 26 
% of my respondents knew about it. None of my respondents without legal background had 
heard of Mensah v. Mensah (2012). Their reactions to the court´s ruling were a mixture of 
surprise and disappointment. It may therefore be appropriate to say that a considerable 
number of Ghanaians may not be aware of the relevant cases on the division of matrimonial 
property upon divorce. Even the magistrate I interviewed at the Accra family tribunal was 
not aware of it. How then can women make convincing cases for their share of marital 
properties when they are not aware of the rights they have? 
 
Unlike in developed countries like Norway where court rulings are available online, legal 
practitioners in Ghana have to go to the Supreme Court library and pay for the cases before 
they can get access to them. As of December 2012, the fee for getting access to a case from 
the Supreme Court library was 10 GHC ($5.2). The cases are not available to everyone. 
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They are hidden in the Supreme Court library. This might be an important reason why most 
of the people I interviewed, even though educated, were not aware of the current rulings.  
 
Since decisions from the courts are not easily accessible,  having legislation on the subject 
matter becomes even more important because once the rights are codified in the law, 
people can easily  get access to it. When people are obliged to pay before getting access, it 
discourages them. All the women´s rights activists I interviewed were of the opinion that 
the case of Mensah v. Mensah (2012) is a big victory for the rights of women with regard 
to marital property. However, they also meant that until the ruling is codified in the laws of 
Ghana, the ordinary woman would not be able to benefit from it. When the cases are not 
communicated through legal information systems
171
, this also makes it easier for the 
Supreme Court, who is not bound by its own rulings, to deviate from it. (I did not ask my 
respondents whether they had read or heard about the case of Mensah v. Mensah (2012) in 
any social media, so it would be difficult to tell whether the ruling could have been 
communicated to people through the media.  
 
4.2.8 Institutional Barriers  
There are also a number of institutional barriers, which may necessitate clear legislation on 
marital property rights upon divorce. First, the high cost of legal services can discourage 
women from claiming their rights in judge-made laws. Lawyers are gatekeepers of the 
courts and can either shut or open the doors of justice. One´s ability to pay for the cost of 
legal services is therefore very essential. Thus, if a woman is not sure of how the outcome 
of the case will be, it will be less encouraging to go the way of the courts to claim a right 
that is provided in earlier court rulings, most especially when the Supreme Court is not 
bound by its previous decisions.  One of my respondents, Mr. Samuel Antwi (30), observed 
that:  
 
                                                 
171 See for instance Bing (2011) pp 1-95 on the importance of publicizing the law through legal information 
systems. 
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“It is generally agreed that the right to a speedy trial is integral to justice delivery. 
However, in Ghana, the red-tape that characterizes judicial proceedings may deter people 
from accessing the justice system.  If therefore women perceive that their cases would drag 
in the courts, in addition to the fact that they are not sure of what the outcome will be, they 
may not, from the beginning, go to the courts.  The implication is that women´s ability to 
claim their rights will be constrained”.  
 
This indicates that there should be clear legislation on property settlement upon divorce so 
that women from the start will have a fair idea of what they are entitled to. It will also 
encourage a lot of men to settle marital property disputes with their estranged wives 
amicably since both parties will have a fair idea of what they are entitled to from the start. 
 
4.2.9 Administrative Hindrances 
Certain administrative hindrances are also the reason why it may be necessary to have clear 
legislation on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana. Laws can be ineffective because 
the people or institutions who apply the law refuse to apply it. For instance officials may 






An example of this can be seen in the Quartson v. Quartson (2012) case. At the time when 
the Appeal Court decided on that case, the Supreme Court had already ruled in Mensah v. 
Mensah (2012) that household chores are to be considered as contribution to the acquisition 
of matrimonial property by stating that:  
 
” We believe that, common sense, and principles of general fundamental human rights 
requires that a person who is married to another, and performs various household chores for 
the other partner like keeping the home…. such that the other partner, has a free hand to 
engage in economic activities must not be discriminated against in the distribution of 
properties acquired during the marriage when the marriage is dissolved. This is so because, 
                                                 
172 Armstrong (1987) p. vii. 
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it can safely be argued that, the acquisition of the properties was facilitated by the massive 
assistance that the other spouse derived from the other”173 (my italics) 
 
Despite this emphasis by the Supreme Court, it is observed that in Quartson v. Quartson 
(2012), the Appeal Court refused to follow the precedent laid down in Mensah v. Mensah 
(2012) stating: 
 
” In the absence of such legislation in Ghana, I am of the considered opinion that domestic 
services rendered, however important they may be, for now, cannot amount to a 
contribution by a spouse in a property acquired through the financial resources of the other 
spouse. I am of the view that if the courts are left on its own to quantify such domestic 
services without legislative guidance, the result will be judicial chaos in matrimonial 
suits.”174 
 
In response to the above statement by the Appeal Court, the Supreme Court held in that: 
 
“In view of the changing times, it would defy common sense for this court to attempt to 
wait for Parliament to awaken from its slumber and pass a law regulating the sharing of 
joint property. As society evolves, a country’s democratic development and the realization 
of the rights of the citizenry cannot be stunted by the inaction of Parliament. We do not 
think that this court is usurping the role of Parliament, especially in cases where the 
inaction of Parliament results in the denial of justice and delay in the realization of 
constitutional rights...”175 
 
This shows that if the woman in Quartson v. Quartson (2012) had given up after the Appeal 
Court´s ruling or if she did not have the financial means to appeal to the Supreme Court, 
she would not have gotten a fair compensation for her contribution to the acquisition of the 
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disputed property. This also shows how the lower courts do not always heed to the 
constitutional requirement of following the Supreme Court on questions of law, c.f article 
129 (3) of the constitution. 
 
This further indicates that there may be the need for which clearly spells out how marital 
property is to be divided. If such a legal framework within which the courts are to operate 
is put in place, it could contribute to a more unambiguous practice by the courts and make 
it easier for spouses to predict their legal positions with regard to marital property upon 
divorce 
4.2.10 Economic Barriers (Capitalism And Poverty) And Legal Empowerment 
Ghana is a capitalist state. 
176
 Capitalism can be defined as an economic and political 
system in which private owners for profit, control a country’s trade and industry.177 
According to the founders of Marxism, the general submission of women is based on the 
private ownership of the means of production and that, the enslavement of women is 
completely and inevitably connected “to the class structure of society because it can only 
be defined in terms of male ownership of private property.”178  
 
 “ The exploitative capitalist production relations” prevents a lot of women from “directly” 
working in the public sector.
179
 It also undervalues domestic work because, in a salary 
economy, domestic work has no value that can be quantified by salary.
180
 This can be said 
to be the reason why proof of substantial financial contribution is required by the courts in 
cases of property settlement upon divorce. This indicates that there may be the need for 
legislation on marital property, which appreciates the value of domestic work, as observed 
by the courts in Mensah v. Mensah (2012). 
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In addition to being a capitalist state, Ghana is a country where poverty is intense and 
widespread.
 
The kind of poverty that exists in Ghana is what some writers refer to as “mass 
poverty”. 181  As opposed to “individual” or “case poverty” where a few people are poor in 
a generally wealthy society, mass poverty is the kind of poverty where being poor is the 
general thing, and not to be poor is the exemption.
182
 Women can be hindered from 
questing after their marital property rights when they are so poor that they cannot afford 
accessing the legal system. This can also force women to stay in marriages even if they 
want to get out.  
 
According to the UN secretary general ´s 2009 report on legal empowerment of the poor 
and eradication of poverty, “a characteristic of virtually all communities living in poverty 
is that they do not have access, on an equal footing, to government institutions and services 
that protect and promote human rights — where such institutions exist in the first place. 
Often, they are also unable to adequately voice their needs, to seek redress against injustice, 
participate in public life, and influence policies that ultimately will shape their lives.” 183 
 
Furthermore, as already observed in chapter 1, it has been discovered that one of the 
reasons why women are susceptible to poverty is because of the “unequal distribution of 
resources within the family.”184 This unequal distribution of resources makes it difficult for 
women to gain access to resources and makes them economically dependent on men, 
thereby making them susceptible to poverty.  
 
Having clear legislation on the portion of marital property a woman is entitled to upon 
divorce will encourage more women to pursue their economic rights upon divorce so they 
can be economically independent of their husbands. Also when women are given an equal 
share of marital property upon divorce, it may make it easy for them to get loans from 
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, which will enable them, establish themselves by starting minor businesses so they 
can stand on their own feet and not be economically dependent on their estranged husbands 
 
4.3 The Probability Of Statutory Laws Being Put In Place In The Near Future 
Because of the above-mentioned conditions which indicate that judge-made non-statutory 
laws may not provide an adequate protection of the marital property rights of women, the 
probability of the court´s decision in Mensah v. Mensah (2012) being codified in the laws 
of Ghana as a step toward ensuring an effective protection of the marital property rights of 
women upon divorce, was one of the main questions I sought answers to in the course of 
my research.  
 
The response I got from almost all my respondents was that it will require a lot for this 
ruling to be codified in the laws of Ghana, mainly because there are more men in 
parliament than women, and since the objective of the ruling is to improve the marital 
property rights of women, it is not likely that it will find favor in the eyes of the men in 
parliament.  This was confirmed by Mrs. Sheila Minka-Premoh, one of the prominent 
members of LAWA Ghana
186
 and Ms. Edna Kuma, executive director of the Africa 
Women Lawyers Association, Ghana branch. These two women have together with the 
organizations they work for drafted a “property rights of spouses bill” which has been 
presented before parliament. The bill was drafted in the year 2000 and was presented 
before parliament in 2008. Since then, nothing has been done about it. Mrs. Sheila Minka-
Premoh said: 
 
”Normally bills have to go through four reading processes. When a bill is laid before 
parliament, it is referred to a committee to review and write a report, and that report is used 
as a basis for the second reading. After the first reading of our property rights of spouses 
bill, it was referred to the constitutional, legal and parliamentary affairs committee where 
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there was no female and then it was referred to another committee. They had a few women 
in that committee but you could see that the male attitudes towards the bill was bad, so they 
never got their report ready. We met lawyers, judges, queen mothers, etc. and collated 
various views furnished to help them draft their report but the report never came out. So we 
have done a lot of work on it but we are not making much progress because of the attitudes 
of the men in parliament.”187 
 
Ms. Edna Kuma on the other hand observed that: 
 
 ”Those raising the resistance in parliament are from the matrilineal side because of the 
inheritance system. And it´s also because parliament is male-dominated. These are the two 
reasons. The men feel threatened that the women are just coming to take their properties 
from them. They claim if it is passed then the women are pulling the rag from under their 
feet.”188 
 
It can be inferred from this that it is unlikely that the Ghanaian parliament will statutory 
laws on property settlement upon divorce in the near future even though it has a 
constitutional obligation to do so. Whether or not Ghana could be obliged by international 




Discoveries from my empirical research reveal that there are certain conditions in the 
Ghanaian society, which indicate that judge-made laws in the form of case law may not be 
an adequate medium to ensure the protection of the marital property rights of women. The 
paramount of these conditions are the plurality of marital forms, the economy, institutional 
barriers, religious barriers, social norms, patriarchy and administrative hindrances. These 
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conditions further suggest that an adequate protection of the marital property rights of 
spouses may require a codification of these rights in the laws of Ghana. These same 
conditions indicate that it will require a lot for statutory laws to be put in place that give 
women equal access to marital property upon divorce. Also, these conditions could signify 
possible challenges that may be faced in the implementation of a future law on property 
settlement upon divorce in Ghana. 
 
My empirical research show that many Ghanaians do not seem to find anything wrong with 
a woman leaving the matrimonial home with nothing after divorce, especially if she did not 
contribute financially to the acquisition of marital property.
189
 However, for people who are 
interested in the effective protection and advancement of women, law reform is one of 
several ways through which they can attain their goals.
190
 This is because having legislative 
guidelines on property settlement upon divorce will contribute immensely to the legal 
empowerment of Ghanaian women with regard to marital property by giving them “the 
legal tools to proactively shield themselves from” 191 unjustifiable differential treatment 
during property settlement upon divorce. “Legal empowerment (…) seeks to establish the 
rule of law and ensure equal and equitable access to justice and tackle”192 issues from their 
origin. If the law is obeyed by the society “it can ensure protection for all and can prevent 
and protect against abuse of authority, bias and”193 unjustifiable differential treatment of 
women.  
 
This suggests that the very act of creating rights will contribute to enlightening both policy 
makers and ordinary citizens.
194
 One could argue that for many women, the legal system is 
out of reach and that laws might not be able to give them the protection they seek in any 
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 However, law reforms create future possibilities even for the women to whom the 
legal system may seem inaccessible.
 196
 Even though cultural or economic constraints may 
prevent women from knowing or claiming their matrimonial property rights today, unless 
the rights are enshrined in the law, lack of legislation may place perpetual limitations on 
their lives as well as the lives of generations that will come after them.
197
 
In the words of Ms. Edna Kuma, ” the effective implementation of a bill on the property 
rights of spouses upon divorce will most definitely face some challenges, but if passing the 
intestate succession bill has contributed to improving the property rights of widows, what 
shows that a bill on the property rights of spouses will not improve the property rights of 
women when they get divorced?”  
 
It can also be argued that leaving the division of marital property to the discretion of the 
courts gives the courts the free room to divide marital property fairly between spouses. 
However, having laws on the subject matter will give the courts a framework within which 
they have to operate.  This can be very necessary especially in a place like Ghana where the 
Supreme Court is not bound by its own earlier rulings. When the courts are given the 
freedom to divide marital property according to their own discretion, it creates 
inconsistencies in the rule of law and thus does not give the people  (especially women), 
the possibility of predicting their own legal position with regard to marital property. This is 
because “while statute law can be known in advance, case law can only be known at the 
same time that it is made. If there is no statutory provision covering a particular legal point, 
the parties may not know what their rights are until after the judge has decided the dispute 
between them.”198  
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Furthermore, the principle of the separation of powers enshrined in chapters 8 to 11 of the 
constitution is met to a larger degree by legislation than by judge-made law.
199
 In the words 
of Ingman, “Parliament makes law but does not enforce it, whereas judge-made law is 
enforced by the very people who make it.”200 Giving the Judiciary in Ghana the freedom to 
make and enforce laws on property settlement as and when it pleases may not entirely be in 
accordance with the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 
 
Since it has been concluded that non-statutory law is not sufficient to ensure the adequate 
protection of the marital property rights of women, and Ghana has refused to heed to her 
constitutional requirement to put statutory laws in place in order to achieve this purpose, 
c.f. article 22 of the constitution, the question remains whether Ghana could be obliged by 
international norms to clearly codify the matrimonial property rights of spouses in her 

















5 DOES THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATIVE 
GUIDELINES ON PROPERTY SETTLEMENT UPON DIVORCE IN 
GHANA CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE CEDAW? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The notion of ”state sovereignty” and the ”non-interference ”in the internal matters of the 
state has always been regarded as an essential principle in international relations.
201
 
Accordingly, a generally accepted doctrine in international relations is that the state is the 
primary element, not the individual.
 202
  Some writers use the term realism as an equivalent 
word for the respect that state interests have, the most important of which are security and 
state power.
 203
  The discipline of international human rights has consequently been 
described as a subject that ”projects liberalism into a realist world”- a world which has 




The principle of state sovereignty implies that sovereign states can choose to submit to 
binding legal schemes in the form of treaties and other supranational legal instruments. 
This means the sovereignty principle also includes a state´s right to relinquish sovereignty, 
or place restrictions on its own sovereignty through different kinds of agreements. 
However, this also implies that every state is sovereign and is only subject to its own will. 
Thus, each state is only bound by rules it has accepted in accordance with international law.  
 
In this chapter I am discussing the extent to which Ghana is meeting her obligations in the 
CEDAW with regard to the lack of formal legislation on property settlement upon divorce. 
The first question in this regard is whether this convention demands that Ghana makes 
legislation on the division of matrimonial property upon divorce in order to ensure the 
                                                 
201 Forsythe (2010) p. 218.  
202 Ibid p. 217-218.  
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid p. 218.  
 89 
equal treatment of men and women during property settlement upon divorce. If this 
question is answered in the affirmative, it will mean that Ghana is breaching her obligations 
in the CEDAW and many of the human rights conventions that she has ratified, which aim 
at protecting the economic rights of women. A negative answer on the other hand will lead 
to a question of whether a claim by Ghana that she is not obliged to make such legislation 
if “other means” can be used to achieve the same purpose, will be upheld, and whether 
Ghana is actually employing such “other means”. 
 
In order to answer the question of whether or not Ghana is obliged by international norms 
to make formal legislation on property settlement upon divorce, I will first give an analysis 
of the connection between the problem statement of this dissertation and the idea and 
concept of international human rights. This will give a better understanding of the issues 
that will be raised in this chapter.  
 
5.2 The Concept Of International Human Rights In Light Of Women’s Rights 
To An Equal Share Of Matrimonial Property Upon Divorce 
Høstmælingen defines human rights as fundamental rights and freedoms that individuals 
have in relation to state authorities, and which are as a result of international agreements 
and practices.
205
 Thus, he focuses on the role of the government in relation to the citizens, 
which includes an obligation to enact necessary legislation in order to protect the rights of 
the citizens. This is in line with article 27 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties 
(1969), which states that:  
 
“a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty”.  
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Article 27 suggests that a state cannot argue that it is waiting for its legislature to pass laws 
before fulfilling its obligations in a convention it has consented to. 
206
 Hence, if it is 
necessary for a negotiating state to a convention to enact new legislation or modify extant 
laws in order to perform its duties in the convention, the state has to do so before the 
convention enters into force. 
207
 Otherwise, the state runs a risk of being in violation of its 
conventional obligations. This implies that if it is found that Ghana is obliged to legally 
empower women with regard to their marital property rights upon divorce in light of the 
CEDAW, a claim by Ghana that she is s not in violation of her international human rights 





This chapter tends to concentrate on whether the sources of human rights law applicable to 
Ghana today, especially the CEDAW, impose upon the country a duty or responsibility to 
put in place substantive legislative guidelines on the division of matrimonial property upon 
divorce. 
 
Worthy of observation is that “equality before the law” or “non-discrimination before the 
law” is emphasized in all the different sources of human rights law such as treaties, court 
rulings, and literature on human rights, and is often included as a criterion in the definition 
of the term human rights. Many regard equality or non-discrimination as the core concept 
of the idea of human rights, and hence the advocacy for women's rights to an equal share of 
matrimonial property upon divorce can be said to be an important demand for equal 
treatment before the law.  
 
As already noted, (see chapter 2), Ghana has embodied the principle of the equality of men 
and women with regard to matrimonial property in her national constitution. This is in 
                                                 




conformance with article 2 (a) of the CEDAW. The question remains whether this principle 
is being applied in practice, or whether it is merely a political principle.   
 
It is important at this point to draw attention to the legal fact that the rights enshrined in 
human rights conventions can only be materialized if they are integrated into the national 
laws of the state.
209
 In some countries like France and Germany, a treaty can be allowed to 
be part of the national law without legislation after “it has been concluded in accordance 
with the constitution and has entered into force for the state.” 210 This is called “monism” or 
“the monist approach”.211 In countries like Norway and the United Kingdom on the other 
hand, treaties do not have any special position in the national constitution. The rights and 
obligations provided in them do not have a direct impact on the internal laws of the state 
unless they are included in the domestic law through legislation. 
212
 This is called the 
“dualism” or “the dualist approach.” 213 
 
 Dualism is the approach used in the Ghana legal system, c.f. articles 11 (1) b and 106 (11) 
of the constitution. Even though Ghana has ratified the CEDAW, she has not yet 
incorporated it into her domestic laws.
214
 The question is therefore not which rights the 
individuals in Ghana can deduce from the CEDAW, but whether Ghana is breaching its 
obligations under international law. The fact that Ghana has not incorporated the CEDAW 
in her domestic laws might also contribute to hindering the effective protection of the 




                                                 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid p.146 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid p. 150 
213 Ibid. 
214 Report by Ghana´s Ministry of Women and Children´s Affairs (2006) p. 4 
215 This is of particular interest because in its reply to the CEDAW committee´s comments on the third, fourth and fifth periodic reports 
of Ghana on the implementation of the CEDAW, Ghana stated that, as the laws stand per today, ”counsel can cite (…) the CEDAW for 
its persuasive value only and it is not binding on the courts.” 
 92 
5.3 Matrimonial Property Rights Of Women Upon Divorce In Ghana In 
Relation To The Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
 
5.3.1 Method Of Interpreting International Conventions  
The guidelines for interpretation of treaties outlined in the Vienna convention of 1969 are 
used as a guideline in my effort to interpret the CEDAW in light of the object of my study. 
This is because these guidelines “enunciate in essence generally accepted principles of 
international law” which are applied by international human rights courts in their 






 differentiates between three different theories of treaty interpretation. He 
observes that a treaty can be interpreted based on the objective theory of interpretation, 
where the emphasis is on the analysis of the text, the subjective interpretation theory, 
where the emphasis is on identifying the will of the contracting parties, and the teleological 
theory of interpretation where the emphasis is on realizing the purpose of the treaty.  These 
three approaches do not necessarily contradict each other. This is because it can be safely 
argued that the will of the parties will primarily be expressed in the text of the treaty, and 
emphasizing on the purpose of the treaty when its text gives room for multiple 
interpretations is entirely legitimate. Accordingly, these three theories will be applied in the 
following in my attempt to interpret the CEDAW in light of the lack of formal legislation 
on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana. 
 
When interpreting a treaty, the ordinary meaning of its words often serve as the starting 
point, c.f. article 31(1) of the Vienna convention, which states that “a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms…” The ordinary meaning refers to how the words are generally understood.218  This 
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is in conformance with the objective theory of treaty interpretation.  
 
Also, the requirements of the treaty are to be understood “in their context and in light of 
their object and purpose”. The context encompasses the whole treaty including its 
preamble and annexes and other instruments acknowledged in article 31 (2) litra a and litra 
b of the Vienna convention. This entails applying the teleological treaty interpretation 
method.  
 
With regard to the subjective interpretation theory, the European Human Rights Court has 
observed that, “the very essence of the (European Human Rights) Convention is respect for 
human dignity and human freedom.”219 
The EHR Commission also observed in Wemhoff v. Germany (1968) that:  
“it is also necessary to seek the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realize the 
aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest 
possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties.”220 
 
Based on this, the EHR Commission has for instance interpreted article 6 (1) of the EHRC 
to include the right to court hearing even though this is not explicitly specified in the 
article. See the case of Golder v. The United Kingdom (1975) where the Commission 
stated that ” The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a 
judge ranks as one of the universally “recognized” fundamental principles of law; the same 
is true of the principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice”. 221 Thus, it 
was concluded that “it follows that the right of access (to court) constitutes an element 
which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 para. 1. This (…) is based on the very 
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terms of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 1 (…) read in its context and having regard to 
the object and purpose of the Convention”222 
 
From the ruling of the Committee, it can be inferred that the main purpose or function of 
international human rights conventions in general is to protect the rights of individuals. 
Secondly, in interpreting the conventions, less emphasis has to be laid on the sovereignty of 
the state and greater emphasis on an objective interpretation consistent with what the 
Member States meant when signing a convention.  
 
These are regarded as general principles of interpreting human rights conventions. 
Accordingly, in my effort to interpret the CEDAW in light of the marital property rights of 
women in Ghana per today, less emphasis will be laid on Ghana´s sovereignty as a state, 
whilst the focus will be on the purpose of the CEDAW, which according to the preamble is 
to “adopt measures to required for the elimination of (…) in all its forms and 
manifestations” and to “achieve full equality between men and women” CEDAW.  
 
5.3.2 Does The CEDAW Require Member States To Accord Indirect Contributions 
Such As Household Chores, Etc The Same Weight As Substantial Financial 
Contribution? 
 
The matrimonial property rights of women is enshrined in article 16 (1) of the CEDAW 
which states that “ States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure (…) on a 
basis of equality of men and women: 
 
 (h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, enjoyment and 
disposition of property…”  
According to the CEDAW committee´s general recommendation no. 21
223
, article 16 (1) h 
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The question is whether the term “ same rights” in respect of ownership of property means 
the equal division of property acquired during marriage, upon divorce. In order to answer 
this question, article 16 (1) litra h has to be interpreted in light of the above-mentioned 
general principles that have been established for the interpretation of international 
conventions. 
 
A synonym of the word “same” is “equal”. Thus the ordinary meaning of the term “same 
rights” is “equal rights”.  Accordingly, considering the ordinary meaning of the words in 
article 16 (1) litra h alone, it could be concluded that the CEDAW only requires the state 
parties to guarantee women an equal share of marital property upon divorce when the 
contribution from both spouses during the marriage is the same. 
 
However, as already mentioned several times in this dissertation, many Ghanaian women´s 
contribution to the acquisition of property is often in the form of indirect or non-financial 
contribution. The question is whether article 16 (1) litra h could imply that a woman should 
have the right to an equal share of marital property even if she did not contribute 
financially to its acquisition. In other words, is indirect non-financial contribution enough 
to earn women an equal share of marital property according to article 16 (1) litra h of the 
CEDAW?  
 
As already noted, international conventions are to be understood in their context, and the 
context encompasses the whole treaty, c.f. article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and other 
articles in the convention are part of the context. According to article 14 of the CEDAW, 
States Parties shall take into account the “significant roles, which rural women play in the 
economic survival of their families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of 
the economy” (my italics). 
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The expression “take into account” suggests that the role women play in the non-monetized 
sector should to some extent be considered as a form of contribution. The article is silent on 
how much or to which extent this form of indirect contribution should count. It merely 
denotes that the non-monetized sector of the economy should not be brushed aside or 
overlooked c.f. the expression “the significant role”. It can be argued that the term “take 
into account” implies that the non-monetized sector of the economy alone does not 
necessarily have to amount to an equal share in property acquired during the subsistence of 
the marriage since this is something that just has to be considered. However, article 14 
acknowledges that the role that women play in the non-monetized sector of the economy is 
what leads to the economic survival of the families. This is because the contribution of the 
woman in the form of taking care of the children and the home or buy taking care of the 
family´s consumer expenditure is of great importance since without it, the man cannot go 
out and work, or save the money he earns in order to acquire properties.  
 
Put differently, the convention recognizes the fact that by taking care of the home and 
taking care of the family´s consumer expenditure, many women free up time and capital for 
their husbands to work, earn, and save money. Thus, even though article 14 of the 
convention does not state to which extent women´s contribution to the non-monetized 
sector of the economy should count, the wording of the article indicates that it should not 
be ignored, and that it should be taken into consideration since the purpose of the CEDAW 
is to ensure that women and men can enjoy economic rights on an equal basis. 
 
The CEDAW committee´s general recommendations no. 21 gives a clear answer to this 
question by stating clearly that “financial and non-financial contributions should be 
accorded the same weight”.225 This conclusion was drawn after the committee noted that 
the great emphasis some countries place on “financial contributions” made with regard to 
the acquisition of marital property lessens the importance of indirect contributions such” as 
raising children, caring for elderly relatives and discharging household duties.”226 The 
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committee also observed that “often, such contributions of a non-financial nature by the 
wife enable the husband to earn an income and increase the assets.” 227  
 
From this, it can be deduced that the contribution women provide in the non-monetized 
sector of the economy is to be considered as contribution, which entitles women to an equal 
share in marital property upon divorce. Accordingly, states that have signed the CEDAW, 
including Ghana are required to lay equal emphasis on the indirect contributions of women 
such as home-making, and substantial financial contribution during property settlement 
upon divorce. 
 
Though not the main object of investigation in this study, it is noteworthy that 16 (1) does 
not only apply at the dissolution of marriage, but also during the marriage, thereby giving 
women access to marital property on an equal basis with men to marital property during the 
marriage.
228
 Accordingly, Ghana is not only obliged to ensure that women are not denied 
the enjoyment of their property rights during the dissolution of marriage, but is also to 
ensure that women have the same legal rights to common property as men during the 
marriage. The legal consequence of this as mentioned by the CEDAW committee is that it 
will increase women´s power to administer “the disposition of the property or the income 
derived from it.”229 For instance a man cannot sell or dispose of common property 
(especially the matrimonial home) without the consent of the wife. Based on my interviews 
and the facts of relevant case law in Ghana, it is my opinion that it may even be much more 
difficult for women to claim such rights during marriage if they do not have formal legal 
grounds for it. 
 
Women´s right to an equal share of marital property is also enshrined in article Article 7 (d) 
of the Maputo protocol which states that States Parties shall (…) ensure that in case of 
separation, divorce or annulment of marriage, women and men shall have the right to an 
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equitable sharing of the joint property deriving from the marriage.  It is important to 
observe that the word “equitable” does not mean, “equal”. It means “fair and impartial”.  
 
Thus, article 7 (d) places the rights of men to a fair share of property on the same level as 
the rights of women without making any exceptions. This indicates that both men and 
women are to get a fair share of marital property upon divorce regardless of whether they 
contributed financially or not to its acquisition.  
 
 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that article 16 (1) h of the CEDAW may be regarded as a 
conventional establishment of non-financial contribution as a form of contribution to the 
acquisition of marital property, which is enough to give women an equal share of marital 
property upon divorce. 
 
This principle that non-financial contribution should be regarded as contribution on equal 
basis with financial contribution has been established in some countries that have also 




. In Norway, the 
principle was established in Husmordommen
232
 (the housewife case of 1975), a ruling, 
which came out even before, the CEDAW entered into force.   
 
In Husmordommen, a couple had been married for 19 years with three children. Their 
matrimonial home, which was built in the course of the marriage, was financed solely with 
the man´s income. He also contributed physically to the building of the house. Upon 
divorce the man claimed sole ownership of the house whilst the woman claimed joint 
ownership of the house with 50 percent share. The Norwegian Supreme Court ruling in 
favour of the woman held that: 
 
                                                 
230 Electronic journal of comparative law. Available at http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-4.pdf. (Accessed 
01.10.2013) 
231 Dóci (2003) p.211 
232 Rt.1975 s. 220  
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“the acquisition of the house was financed with the man´s income and that he had 
physically contributed directly to its construction, but his wife was fully occupied with 
taking care of the house and their three young children. In my view, this is what made it 
possible for the man to put so much work into the construction. When spouses practice 
such a division of labor, it leads to the wife being cut off from paid work and from any 
great physical participation in the construction business. The wife can be said to have 
helped the family get their own home, and legally I find it inappropriate to regard this effort 
as insignificant in relation to the man's efforts in in the acquisition of the property.”233 (my 
translation) 
 
With this ruling, the principle that women should be entitled to an equal share of 
matrimonial property even if they have not contributed substantially to its acquisition was 
established in Norwegian law. Since then, it has been used in many court decisions and in 
1991 it was codified in article 31 (3) of the Norwegian Matrimonial Causes Act 
(Ekteskapsloven). In that case, the court specifically acknowledged “housework” as a form 
of contribution. The woman provided indirect contributions by taking care of their children 
and the home, making it possible for the husband to provide direct contributions by 
building the house and working and earning money in order to provide the materials used 
for the building.  
 
“Housework” as mentioned in Husmordommen is more specific and limited than "non-
monetized sector" as stated in article 14 of the CEDAW. Thus, the convention gives a 
broader protection since it acknowledges other forms of contribution apart from 
housework. All the same, housework and other non-financial contributions are still not 
valued in Ghana and are in light of the latest supreme court ruling on the division of 
matrimonial property, Quartson v. Quartson (2012) not enough to establish for the woman 
an equal share in matrimonial property upon divorce. This indicates that Ghana is not ready 
to take into account the non-monetized sector of the economy, which many Ghanaian 
women represent, during property settlement upon divorce, thereby violating her obligation 
                                                 
233 Ibid p. 226. 
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in article 16 (1) h of the CEDAW. 
 
One of the fundamental criteria regulating the initiation and carrying out of legal 
commitments is “good faith” 234, c.f. article 31 (1)235 of the Vienna convention. Good faith 
demands that signatories to the treaty are sincere, just and rational in relation to the 
contents of the treaty.
236
 When a convention forbids the “abuse of rights”, it imposes upon 





Accordingly, the fact that many other signatories to the CEDAW recognize non-financial 
contribution as a form of contribution to property acquisition in conformance with article 
16 (1) h of the CEDAW indicates that countries like Ghana that have also ratified the 
CEDAW but are not conforming to its requirements are not acting in good faith. This is 
because they are not honoring the “legitimate expectations”238 they may have risen in the 
other signatories to the convention and the international community.  
 
5.3.3 Do Women In Ghana Suffer Discrimination During Property Settlement 
Upon Divorce? 
 
Since it has been established that non-financial contribution under the CEDAW is to be 
regarded as a form of contribution that entitles the woman to an equal share of marital 
property, the question remains whether the current rule of law on property settlement upon 
divorce in Ghana, which leads to many women not getting an equal share of matrimonial 
property upon divorce because of the demand for proof of substantial financial 
                                                 
234 Villiger (2009) p. 425 
235 See also article 26 on pacta sunt servanda. 
236 Villiger (2009) p. 426. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Woxholt (2006 ) p. 402 (my translation) 
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contribution, qualifies to be described as “discrimination against women” in light of the 
CEDAW.  
In order to answer this question, the definition of “discrimination” in the CEDAW must be 
clarified. The prohibition of discrimination in the CEDAW is used as the legal basis 
because it must first be established whether the effect the current rule of law on property 
settlement upon divorce as discussed in chapter 3 has on women in Ghana as discussed in 
chapter 4 is a conventionally unacceptable differential treatment of women, which qualifies 
as “discrimination” in light of the CEDAW. 
 
The definition of discrimination against women in article 1 of the CEDAW can be summed 
up as:  
 
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction which has the effect or purpose of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.   
 
From this definition it can be deduced that it is the enjoyment of women´s human rights 
and fundamental freedoms that the convention seeks to protect. The question is whether 
women´s right to an equal share of marital property is to be regarded as a human right in 
light of the CEDAW. 
 
As already noted, the prohibition of discrimination against women during property 
settlement upon divorce is enshrined in article16 (1) h of the CEDAW. This indicates that 
women´s right to an equal share of marital property is to be regarded as a human right, 
since the CEDAW is a human rights convention. This is also in accordance with article 3 of 
the ICESCR,
239
 which states that the states parties are “to undertake to ensure the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic rights (…).” 
 
                                                 
239 International convenant on social, economic and cultural rights. 
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From the above definition of discrimination against women, it can be inferred that an act 
must fulfill certain conditions in order to qualify as discrimination against women. These 
conditions will be presented in the following and discussed one after the other. 
 
To begin with, for an act to qualify as discrimination against women, the act must 
constitute a differential treatment, which is unjustifiable (distinction, exclusion or 
restriction). The differential treatment must be ”unjustifiable” because, not all not all 
differential treatments constitute discrimination in light of article 1.
 240
 This means that for 
a person to be able to invoke article 1 of the CEDAW, there must be a form of treatment of 
the person, whether through deliberate action or by way of inaction by the authorities.
241
 





Secondly, this differential treatment should be given on the basis of sex, which is the 
prohibited ground for unjustifiable differential treatment according to the CEDAW. This 
means that the unjustifiable differential treatment should be given to women by virtue of 




Furthermore, the differential treatment should lead to in women being disadvantaged in the 
enjoyment of their rights. The enjoyment of their rights should be impaired or nullified as a 
result of this unjustifiable differential treatment.  
 
                                                 
240 An example of this is the use of “preferential treatment or quota systems to advance women's integration into 
education, the economy, politics and employment”. See CEDAW commitee´s General Recommendation no. 5 (1998) 
Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm Accessed 
30.04.2013. 
241 Emberland (2006) p. 207. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Depending on its object and purpose, the various human rights conventions each have their prohibited grounds 
for unjustifiable differential treatment. For instance the ICCPR has race, colour, language, religion, political opinion, 
etc as its prohibited grounds. c. f article 26 of the ICCPR. 
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Finally, the differential treatment does not necessarily need to have the objective of putting 
women in a disadvantaged position, as long as its effect yields the same results. This 
implies that an act or exclusion that neither has the purpose nor effect of impairing or 
nullifying the enjoyment of rights by women does not qualify as discrimination. In the 
same way, an act, law or policy which may not have the purpose of preventing women 
from enjoying their rights will qualify as discrimination if its effects impair the enjoyment 
of rights by women.    
 
From the wording of article 1 of the CEDAW, it can be deduced that these conditions are 
cumulative conditions. This means that an act must fulfill all these four conditions in order 
to qualify as discrimination against women in light of the CEDAW. The question is 
whether the current rule of the law on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana, where 
spouses (in most cases women) must show proof of substantial financial contribution in 
order to be regarded as co-owners of marital property upon divorce fulfills the above-
mentioned conditions.  
 
The words distinction, exclusion and restriction denote the denial of access to something. 
As mentioned earlier, (see chapter 1) it is mostly women who constitute the non-monetized 
sector of the Ghanaian economy and the CEDAW committee has stated that “financial and 
non-financial contributions should be accorded the same weight”. However, the current 
rule of law on property settlement upon divorce does not accord non-financial contribution 
to the acquisition of marital assets the same relevance as financial contribution. This 
indicates that the contribution of men is regarded as more important than that of women 
and therefore constitutes a differential treatment of women during property settlement upon 
divorce. This differential treatment cannot be said to be justifiable since both financial and 
non-financial contributions in the family is what sustains the “economic survival of the 
families” c.f article 14 of the CEDAW. 
 
The reason why it is women who are often affected negatively by the demand for proof of 
substantial financial contribution can be said to be due to the stereotyped gender-roles in 
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the society, which in itself is not in conformance with article 5 of the CEDAW. This is 
reflected in the fact that almost all the cases of property settlement upon divorce brought 
before the courts, are brought by women who have been denied a share in jointly-acquired 
marital properties. As presented in chapter 3, relevant case law shows that where it is the 
woman who has contributed the most to the acquisition of marital properties, the courts 
divide the properties equally between them and their husbands. (see for instance the case of 
Mensah v. Mensah 1998 and Mensah v. Mensah 2012). However, if where it is the men 
who have contributed the most, the women are asked to show proof of their contributions. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the differential treatment given to women during property 
settlement upon divorce is done on the basis of sex. 
 
Ghanaian women often find it difficult to show proof of the contributions they may have 
made to the acquisition of marital assets since most of their work cannot be quantified in 
monetary terms. Also they may not have receipts of all the consumer expenditure they may 
have taken care of in the course of the marriage. Furthermore, the only way for women to 
get an equal share of matrimonial property upon divorce is by going to court. However, 
many women cannot access the legal system due to factors like economic and institutional 
barriers (and other factors presented in chapter 4). This results in many women being 
denied an equal share in marital property upon divorce, thereby leaving them economically 
destitute.  
 
Consequently, a lot of women are often put in a disadvantaged position with regard to the 
enjoyment of their marital property rights upon divorce. In light of this, the current legal 
framework on property settlement in Ghana can be described as having the effect of 
preventing many women from enjoying their marital property rights.  
 
Accordingly, all the four conditions that must be fulfilled for an act to qualify as 
discrimination against women in light of the CEDAW, can be said to be fulfilled. It would 
therefore be just to conclude that the fact that Ghanaian women in most cases do not get an 
equal share of matrimonial property upon divorce because of the great emphasis that is laid 
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on proof of substantial financial contribution by the courts, qualifies to be described as 
discrimination against women in light of the CEDAW. Many Ghanaians attribute the 





The question then is whether Ghana is obliged by the CEDAW to make legislation on 
property settlement upon divorce, or whether Ghana has a freedom of choice with regard to 
which means to use in order to eliminate this form of discrimination. In other words, can 
Ghana justify the lack of legislation on property settlement by arguing that other means can 
serve the same purpose? 
 
5.3.4 Is Ghana Obliged To Use Legislation As The Medium To Ensure Adequate 
protection of the Marital Property Rights of Women According To The 
CEDAW? 
 
In order to answer the question of whether or not Ghana is obliged to make legislation on 
property settlement as the means to eliminate discrimination against women during 
property settlement upon divorce, one has to look at the means for elimination of 
discrimination against women that are suggested in article 16 (1) of the CEDAW. This is 
because it will give a better understanding of whether or not Ghana is using the means she 
has agreed to use, by ratifying the CEDAW. 
 
According to article 16 (1) of the CEDAW, states are to employ “all appropriate 
measures” in order to ensure the elimination of discrimination against women during 
property settlement upon divorce. 
 
The use of the term all appropriate means suggests that the states have the freedom of 
choice as to which means to use to eliminate discrimination against women with regard to 
                                                 
244 This is a view shared by all the women´s rights advocates I interviewed as part of my empirical research. shared 
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marital property upon divorce. Thus, in light of the wording of article 16 (1), the 
fundamental principle is that Ghana is not obliged to make legislation on property 
settlement upon divorce. Ghana can use any means she deems fit as long as it will 
guarantee women the freedom to enjoy their marital property rights on an equal basis with 
men.  
 
The question then is whether a claim by Ghana that she is not obliged to make legislation if 
“other appropriate means” can be used to eliminate discrimination against women during 
property settlement upon divorce, will be upheld.  Whether or not Ghana is employing such 
“other appropriate means” and to which extent these means will actually achieve the 
intended purpose, are also other questions that may need further investigation.  
5.3.5 Can Ghana Choose To Use Other ”Appropriate Means” Instead Of 
Legislation?  
 
In order to answer the question of whether a claim by Ghana that she is not obliged to make 
legislation if “other appropriate means” can be used to eliminate discrimination against 
women during property settlement upon divorce, will be upheld, the term “all appropriate 
means” in article 16 (1) has to be interpreted in light of the object and purpose of the 
CEDAW, c.f. article 31 (1) of the Vienna convention. This is because an interpretation of 
article 16 will give a clearer understanding of whether or not legislation is required even 
though it is not explicitly mentioned. 
 
As already noted, the overarching purpose of the CEDAW is to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women. According to the CEDAW committee,
245
 “the elimination of 
discrimination against women requires States Parties to provide for substantive as well as 
formal equality. Formal equality may be achieved by adopting gender-neutral laws and 
policies, which on their face treat women and men equally. Substantive equality can be 
                                                 
245 General recommendation on article 16 of the CEDAW (CEDAW/C/GC/29)  (2013). Available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/comments/CEDAW-C-52-WP-1_en.pdf. Accessed 02.09.2013. 
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achieved only when the States parties examine the application and effects of laws and 
policies and ensure that they provide for equality in fact, accounting for women´s 
disadvantage or exclusion”.246  
 
The Committee also observes that some countries have adopted constitutions that include 
equal protection and non-discrimination provisions but have not revised or adopted 
legislation to eliminate the discriminatory aspects of their family law regimes and that all 
these constitutional and legal frameworks are discriminatory, and in violation of article 16 
and other articles of the convention such as articles 2, 5 and 15. In consequence, the fact 
that Ghana has enshrined the principle of women´s rights to property upon divorce in 
article 22 of her constitution but has not adopted any legislation on property settlement 




From this it can be deduced that article 16 does not entirely give the states the freedom of 
choice as to which means to use in order to ensure the elimination of discrimination against 
women during property settlement upon divorce. Legislation is required as one of the 
means, which the states must use. This implies that legal empowerment is regarded as a 
human right according to the CEDAW, and Ghana is consequently obliged by the CEDAW 
to make laws on property settlement upon divorce.  
 
However the word “law” in Ghana can be quite ambiguous. This is because in the Ghana 
legal system “law” encompasses written statutes, case law and unwritten jurisprudence, c. f 
article 11 of the constitution. The question is whether “law” as mentioned in the CEDAW 
only encompasses written statutes.  
 
According to the CEDAW committee, “the preservation of multiple legal systems is in 
itself discriminatory against women” and that “States parties should adopt written family 
codes  or personal status laws that provide for equality between spouses irrespective of 
                                                 
246 Ibid para. 8. 
247 Ibid para 10. 
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their religious or ethnic identity or community, in accordance with the Convention and the 
Committee´s general recommendations”.248 (My italics) 
 
Apart from that, article 7 (d) of the Maputo protocol specifically mentions legislation as the 
appropriate tool to be used to achieve the equitable division of matrimonial property 
between spouses upon divorce. This strengthens the idea that legislation is needed not only 
as one of many other appropriate means, but also as the most essential appropriate means to 
guarantee the economic rights of women upon divorce.  
 
Furthermore, the Committee on the CESCR
249
 has observed in its General Comment no. 16 
on article 3 of the ICESCR
250
 that  “ guarantees of non-discrimination and equality in 
international human rights treaties mandate both de facto and de jure equality. De jure (or 
formal) equality and de facto (or substantive) equality are different but interconnected 
concepts. Formal equality assumes that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats men 
and women in a neutral manner. Substantive equality is concerned, in addition, with the 
effects of laws, policies and practices and particular groups experience. 
251
 This indicates 
that the use of formal legislation is of much importance to the international community. 
 
Even though it may be quite unclear whether or not the CEDAW demands that legislation 
should be used, the fact that Ghana has enshrined the use of legislation in her constitution, 
indicates that the use of legislation is deemed by the country itself as an essential tool 
towards eliminating discrimination against women during the division of matrimonial 
property upon divorce. Thus, the lack of legislation on property settlement upon divorce in 
Ghana is not only conventionally unacceptable, but it is also unconstitutional. 
 
                                                 
248 Ibid p. 4 
249 Covenant on civil, economic, social and cultural rights. 
250 This article is ablut ”the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural 
rights” 
251 ICESCR, General Comment No. 16 (2005) p. 2, para. 7. Source: http://www.refworld.org/docid/43f3067ae.html. 
Accessed 03.10.13 
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 and many other women´s rights 
advocates are advocating for substantive legislative guidelines on property settlement upon 
divorce to be put in place suggests that legislation on the subject matter is necessary to 
achieve the desired result, which is getting women an equal share of matrimonial property 
upon divorce.  
 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that Ghana is obliged to make legislation on property 
settlement upon divorce in addition to applying “other appropriate means” in order to 
ensure both de jure and de facto elimination of discrimination against women during 
property settlement upon divorce. By refusing to make such legislation, Ghana is not only 
breaching her obligations in the CEDAW, but she is also breaching her obligations in other 
international conventions she has agreed to, such as the Maputo protocol and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  By violating the non-
discrimination clauses in these conventions, Ghana can also be said to be violating the non-
discrimination clauses in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights and 
the African Charter, since they all have the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex 
as one of their fundamental principles. 
 
5.3.6 Is Ghana Employing “Other Appropriate Means” In Order To Eliminate 
Discrimination Against Women During Property Settlement Upon Divorce? 
 
It is essential to investigate the extent to which Ghana is using “other appropriate means” in 
order to ensure the equal treatment of men on women upon divorce. This is because it can 
be argued that if such other means are being applied and are achieving the desired results, 
then Ghana might not need to make legislation after all. In order to find out whether other 
means are applied, an inquiry must be made into what the convention refers to as other 
appropriate means.  
                                                 
252 Leadership And Advocacy For Women In Africa (Ghana) 
253 African Female lawyers association 
 110 
 
Amongst other things, the CESCR committee´s
254
 , General Comment No. 16 mentions the 
conducting of human rights education and training programs for judges and public officials, 
making available and accessible appropriate remedies such as compensation, educational 
programs and prevention programs, and establishing appropriate venues for redress such as 
courts and tribunals or administrative mechanisms that are accessible to all on the basis of 
equality as some of the appropriate means that can be used. 
 
However, findings of my research did not reveal that such measures have been put in place 
with the purpose of ensuring a better protection of the marital property rights of women 
upon divorce.  
 
Since the purpose of legal empowerment is to use legal instruments to profit the 
underprivileged, the above-mentioned means suggested by the CESCR committee, which 
can be regarded as law- and development-directed projects, cannot be classified as legal 
empowerment.
255
 These efforts will merely help women indirectly and serve other purposes 
as well. They therefore do not have the primary aim of strengthening the marital property 






This chapter has sought to discuss the extent to which Ghana is meeting her international 
human rights obligations in the CEDAW, with regard to the current rule of law on the 
division of matrimonial property upon divorce. 
 
It has been brought to light that the requirement of proof of substantial financial 
contribution, which is the current rule of law on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana 
                                                 
254 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
255  Golub (2010) p. 13. 
256  Ibid 
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per today, and which leads to many women having to leave their matrimonial homes upon 
divorce without an equal share of marital property, constitutes discrimination against 
women in light of the CEDAW. 
 
 It has also been concluded that Ghana is obliged by the CEDAW to make legislation on 
property settlement upon divorce and that the lack of legislation is a violation of Ghana´s 
obligations in article 16 (1) h of the CEDAW to eliminate discrimination against women 
during property settlement upon divorce. In addition, Ghana has to use other appropriate 
means in order to ensure a complete de jure and de facto elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women during property settlement upon divorce. This is because 
according to these conventions, Ghana has taken it upon herself to ensure the equal 
treatment of men and women in all aspects of life, especially in the economic field. Besides 
the CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol which specifically aim at protecting the rights of 
women, all the other relevant conventions urge Ghana to do everything possible especially 
through the use of legislative measures to ensure that both men and women enjoy their 
marital property rights to the fullest.  
 
It cannot be claimed that Ghana has done everything possible to achieve this obligation in 
the CEDAW, since no effort has been made by the state to make legislation on the 
matrimonial property rights of women upon divorce, and no other appropriate measures 
have been taken in this regard. As already mentioned, two NGOs namely, the Leadership 
and Advocacy for Women in Africa for (LAWA) and the African Women Lawyers 
Association (AWLA) are working together and campaigning for such legislation to be 
passed. They have even drafted a bill, which they sent to parliament but their voices have 
not been heard. It is now 27 years ago since the CEDAW was ratified by Ghana, but no 
attempts have been made by the legislature to incorporate it into the laws of Ghana.  
 
Since Ghana has not taken any measures, legislative or otherwise to ensure the equal 
treatment of men and women during the division of matrimonial property upon divorce, it 
may be just to conclude that Ghana is not adhering to her obligations with regards to the 
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economic rights of women in the CEDAW. 
 
It can be concluded say that Ghana has failed to fulfill her obligations in international law 
to protect the matrimonial property rights of her women upon divorce. This is an obligation 
that Ghana took upon herself by signing the CEDAW and other international human rights 
conventions that aim at protecting the marital property rights of women. In my opinion, this 






















The purpose of this study has been to contribute to scholarly findings about women’s 
matrimonial property rights upon divorce in Ghana, in light of legal empowerment. In order 
to achieve this purpose, I aimed at answering the following questions:  
 
1. What is the rule of law regarding the division of matrimonial property upon divorce 
in Ghana? 
2. Does this rule of law constitute an unjustifiable differential treatment of women?  
3. Can judge-made non-statutory laws provide adequate protection of the marital 
property rights of women upon divorce?  
4. Does the lack of legislation on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana constitute 
a breach of the international human rights conventions Ghana has ratified? 
 
This chapter is more or less an abridgement of my dissertation. It is divided into two parts. 
The first part is a presentation of my observations after conducting my research. In the 
second part, I suggest ways in which social-legal realities in Ghana can make the effective 
implementation of future statutory laws on property settlement upon divorce challenging. I 
end this dissertation by calling for further research in this field.  
 
6.2 Findings in the various chapters of the thesis 
When I started my research, I found out there are no substantive laws on the division of 
matrimonial property upon divorce in Ghana.  Because of this, in chapter 3, I made an 
attempt to find out what the law on the division of matrimonial property in Ghana upon 
divorce is per today, by analyzing relevant rulings from the courts in the course of the 
years. It was found that in the course of the years, four principles have being laid down by 
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the courts with regards to the division of matrimonial property upon divorce. These are the 
customary law principle, the substantial contribution principle; the equality is equity 
principle and the jurisprudence of equality principle. 
 
According to the customary law principle, a wife has a domestic responsibility to help her 
husband in his work, but property acquired with the assistance of a wife was regarded as 
the sole property of the husband. Thus according to this principle, a woman cannot claim 
any interest in any property she helped her husband to acquire, c.f. Quartey v. Martey  
(1959).  
 
With time, the customary law principle was abraded and the courts in Yeboah v. Yeboah 
(1974) introduced a new principle, which is the substantial contribution principle. 
According to this principle, even though Customary Law does not encourage the joint 
acquisition of properties by spouses, where it was clear that a spouse has contributed 
substantially to the acquisition of property, she was regarded as a co-owner of the property. 
Factors that were considered by the courts in this regard was agreement between the 
spouses or their intentions with regard to the acquisition of the property, and the amount of 
contribution made by each spouse. 
 
The substantial contribution principle reigned until the principle of “equality is equity” 
was introduced by the Supreme Court in the case of Mensah v. Mensah (1998). According 
to this principle, the courts divided marital property based on what according to their 
discretion would provide fairness. According to the courts, this principle “sung the death 
knell to the substantial contribution principle”.257 The equality is equity principle is 
presumably in accordance with article 22(3) (b) of the 1992 Constitution, which provides 
for equitable distribution of matrimonial property upon the dissolution of marriage. The 
substantial contribution principle and the equality is equity principle, unlike the customary 
law principle seemingly gave a better protection to women than the customary law 
                                                 
257 Mensah v. Mensah (2012). 
 115 
principle. However, this presupposed that they had contributed substantially to the 
acquisition of the properties.  
 
 In February 2012, a new principle, which is the Jurisprudence of Equality Principle, (JEP) 
was established by the Supreme Court who interpreted article 22 of the constitution in light 
of international conventions signed by Ghana, amongst others the CEDAW and the UN 
declaration on human rights. In principle, this principle accords household chores the same 
weight as financial contribution. This means that a woman´s contribution as a housewife 
should be enough to earn for her an equal share in marital properties upon divorce. 
However, when another case (Quartosn v. Quartson 2012) on property settlement upon 
divorce was brought before the courts later in 2012, the court based its decision on the 
substantial contribution principle (in the words of the court, it used the equality is equity 
principle, but it is clear from the arguments that they meant the substantial contribution 
principle) stating that “The decision in Mensah v. Mensah, (2012) is not to be taken as a 
blanket ruling that affords spouses unwarranted access to property when it is clear on the 
evidence that they are not so entitled. Its application and effect will continue to be shaped 
and defined to cater for the specifics of each case.”  Consequently, the woman in this case 
was only given some compensation in the form of cash instead of her prayer for an equal 
share of the matrimonial home, which she built alone with her husband´s money.  
Thus, in chapter 3, it was concluded that there is no clear rule of law on property settlement 
upon divorce in Ghana per today. This is because the jurisprudence of equity principle 
cannot be regarded as the rule of law on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana per 
today, since the same Supreme Court that established this principle deviated from it, 
thereby not making the Jurisprudence of Equity P principle a precedent for subsequent 
cases. The conclusion of the courts in Quartson v. Quartson (2012) indicates that proof of 
substantial financial contribution is still required of women if they want to be regarded as 
co-owners of property acquired during marriage. It was therefore found in chapter 5 that 
this requirement leads to an unjustifiable differential treatment of women since they are 
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mostly the ones who represent the non-monetized sector of the economy, and are therefore 
not able to contribute financially to the acquisition of marital assets in all cases. 
Findings of my research suggest that in order to ensure the effective protection of the 
marital property rights of women in Ghana, they must first be empowered legally. In 
chapter 4, I presented some conditions in the Ghanaian society which indicate that written 
statutes may provide a more effective protection of the marital property rights of women 
than judge-made laws in the form of case law.  The perception of “family”, economic 
barriers, social norms and conditions, institutional barriers and administrative hindrances 
are some of the conditions that were mentioned. It was noted that these conditions might 
also make the effective implementation of a future law on the subject matter quite 
challenging. This is the topic of discussion below in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Possible Challenges That May Be Faced In An Attempt To Effectively 
Implement Future Statutory Laws On Property Settlement Upon Divorce 
In Ghana 
 
A research on the matrimonial property rights of women may require an investigation into 
how the rule of law on the subject matter functions in practice. This is because laws, no 
matter whom or what they aim at protecting “may be misapplied or ignored in practice”. 258  
This happens especially if the laws do not favor the customary practices that the people are 
used to.
 
The law then becomes unproductive because the citizenry disregards it.
259
 The law 
can also be inefficient because of many other factors including economic and social 
barriers.  
 
Thus, even though findings of my research suggest that formal legislation may be able to 
ensure a better protection of the marital property rights of women upon divorce, it was also 
discovered that the same conditions in the Ghanaian society, which may necessitate the 
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establishment of statutory laws on the subject matter, may make the effective 
implementation of such laws challenging when they are put in place. These conditions may 
therefore call for certain requirements regarding the content and form of any future 
statutory laws in order to remedy such conditions. 
 
6.3.1 Polygamy 
For instance polygyny, which is the form of polygamy practiced in Ghana, where a man 
can have many wives at the same time can prevent the effective implementation of future 
statutory laws on property settlement upon divorce.  
 





 it has been suggested that:  
 
(1) Where a husband has more than one wife in a polygamous marriage, the ownership 
of the property shall be determined as follows: 
(a) joint property acquired during the first marriage and before the 
second marriage was contracted is owned by the husband and the 
first wife; and 
(b) any joint property acquired after the second marriage is owned by 
the husband and the co-wives and the same principle is applicable to 
a subsequent marriage. 
 
According to section 10 of the bill, joint property refers to ”property however titled, 
acquired by one or both spouses during the marriage” with the exception of separate 
property.
262
This suggests that joint property is all property acquired during marriage, 
irrespective of which of the spouses who bought it during the marriage. 
 
                                                 
260 Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (Ghana branch) 
261 African Women Lawyers Association (Ghana branch) 




 contends that this form of dividing marital property in polygamous marriages is 
not the best. This is because it will lead to the wife who has stayed longer in the marriage 
getting a bigger portion of the property than the other wives, and that may not necessarily 
lead to a fair division in all circumstances. His reason is that if for instance wife number 
three is highly educated, has a good job and contributes more substantially to the 
acquisition of properties (than the first two wives) after she entered into the marriage, it 
will be unfair to divide property acquired after she became part of the family equally 
between all three spouses and the man. He therefore suggests that all the wives in a 
polygamous marriage should be given an equal share of all marital property upon divorce. 
This means that if there are four wives in the marriage, the properties should be divided 
into five portions so that the man and the wives each gets a one-fifth portion of the 




 also disagrees with the suggestion in section 20 of the suggested property 
rights of spouses bill. This is because ”some first-wives are terrible. They do not give the 
men any sound mind to do their work. So if a later wife gives him the comfort and support 
he needs in order to carry out his work, this wife should be given more of the property than 
the first-wife who probably nags him and does not give him his piece of mind”. 
 
In my opinion, Ainuson and Gandadzie´s  approach may not lead to a fairer division than 
the approach suggested in the property rights of spouses bill. This is because, whichever 
way one views it, an effort to clearly identify the contribution of each of the spouses may 
not be an easy task. Apart from the fact that the division of property in itself may be 
problematic, the amount of property to be divided will also reduce in proportion to the 
number of wives that are to share the properties. The more wives there are in the marriage, 
the less proportion each spouse gets. Since the purpose of future statutory laws will be to 
protect the marital property rights of spouses, there will be little or no marital property to 
protect if the wives are so many that each one is only entitled to a certain portion. 
                                                 
263 Ainuson (2012) 
264 Gandedzie (2012) 
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Consequently, it can be concluded that as long as polygyny exists in Ghana, future 
statutory laws that aim at ensuring the effective protection of the marital property rights of 
spouses may have limited effect for many Ghanaian women. The law will have little or no 
impact as part of the effort to guarantee women an equal share of marital property upon 
divorce, and also as part of Ghana´s effort to heed to her obligations in the CEDAW.  
However, Ghana cannot use the existence of polygamy as an excuse to deprive all married 
Ghanaian women of the effective protection of their marital property rights in accordance 
with the CEDAW.  
 
All my respondents were of the opinion that applying future statutory laws on property 
settlement upon divorce in polygamous marriages will be very challenging. An anonymous 
male respondent (48) said “this is one of the reasons why Ghana should not even attempt to 
make a law on property settlement upon divorce in the first place”. 
 
6.3.2 Cultural Norms 
Some of my respondents also saw the ruling in Mensah v. Mensah (2012) and also future 
statutory laws as unsuitable for the Ghanaian culture. “ This is bad. It is a threat to our 
culture. I heard they even want to give the same rights to cohabitees as well. Why do you 
people want to Europeanize our culture?”, said an anonymous respondent (68). In his 
opinion, it will be entirely wrong for a law that gives women an equal share of marital 
property upon divorce to be implemented in Ghana because, it is against the cultural norms. 
 
When asked why he thinks a future law on property settlement upon divorce may not 
function effectively in practice, Mr. Majeed Osman (26) a student, said “it just can´t work 
because this is Africa. This is not Europe”.  When asked to explain further, he said, “ our 
culture will not allow it. You know how male-dominated our society is. I do not foresee 
such a law functioning in Ghana in the near future.” Many of my academician respondents 
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were of the opinion that it would take some time for such a law to function effectively in 
Ghana even if it is put in place in the near future.  
 
6.3.3 Institutional barriers and administrative hindrances 
Making substantive laws that seek to protect the marital property rights of women may not 
help much if administrative hindrances prevent women from actually getting what is 
rightfully theirs. This implies that in order for a future law on property settlement upon 
divorce to achieve its desired goal, very high standards must be set for those who will be 
administering the law so they do not “practice their own laws, which have no relation to the 
law as it really stands.”265 
 
6.3.4 Lack of access to and unavailability of information 
Moreover, the limited availability and access to information may impair the legal effects of 
future statutory laws on property settlement upon divorce if women are not aware of the 
rights established in those laws. For the effective implementation of future statutory laws to 
achieve the desired results, it would require educating the women on these rights in 




Considering the role religion plays in the lives of many Ghanaians, the extremely religious 
nature of most Ghanaian women, which makes most of them prefer to “leave everything to 
God” in the name of religion instead of pursuing their marital property rights may lead to 
many women not making use of the law in order to acquire their share of marital property 
even if they have a good case. 
 
                                                 
265
 Armstrong (1978) p. vii 
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From the above-mentioned challenges, which are far from exhaustive, it can be concluded 
that good laws on the marital property rights of women upon divorce alone may not bring 
about any significant changes in the matrimonial property rights of women. Thus, legally 
empowering women by putting in place statutory laws that seek to give them an equal share 
of marital property upon divorce is to be regarded as  “a means to an end, not an end in 
itself.”266 In addition to putting legislation in place, Ghana may be obliged to do more if she 
wants to guarantee both de jure and de facto equality between men and women during 
property settlement upon divorce, c.f. article 3 of the CEDAW. 
267
 Having formal gender-
neutral laws may seem satisfactory, but these laws may not have any effect if the socio-
legal and socio-cultural realities on the field are not taken into consideration when 
establishing and implementing these laws.  
 
Other measures such as “awareness-raising, advocacy and capacity building addressed to 
the Government”268 should be taken in order to ensure the effective implementation of any 
future statutory laws on property settlement upon divorce in Ghana. This is because “a fully 
functional and equitable property rights system ( …) requires effective regulation and 
oversight by the State authorities to ensure that asymmetries in property ownerships do not 
create opportunities for exploitation and marginalization.”269 
 
Accordingly, in order to achieve the effective implementation of future statutory laws after 
they have been put in place, Ghana may have to put in place a plan on how to implement 
the laws. Strategic frameworks, benchmarks, short term goals, and long term goals should 
be set up so that progress made with regard to the implementation of the laws can be 
                                                 
266 Report of the UN secretary General A/64/133 (2009) para. 3 
267 Article 3 states that ”States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular (…) economic (…)fields, all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to en sure the full development and advancement of women , for the purpose of 
guaranteeing (my italics) them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis 
of equality with men.” 
268 Report of the UN Secretary General A/64/133 (2009)  para 35. 
269 Ibid para. 28. 
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measured. This way, the country can access its own efforts, how far it has reached, and the 
way forward.  
 
6.4 Prospects For Future Research 
As already mentioned earlier on in this study, I got some ideas for future research as I 
gathered the data for this study. I therefore call for further research in this area. In the 
course of my research, many of my respondents remarked that putting in place laws that 
seek to grant women an equal share of marital property may cause many men to acquire 
properties in the names of their family members, in order to prevent the wife from getting a 
share in them upon divorce. The findings of an in-depth research (before or after future 
statutory laws on property settlement are put in place), on how this will actually go on in 
practice will be very interesting to know. 
 
Also, how future statutory laws will actually be formulated with regard to polygamous 
marriages and how they will be applied in practice when the laws are finally passed, will be 
an interesting research topic.   
 
Since no cases of property settlement upon divorce have been brought before the courts by 
people married under the Mohammedan Ordinance, an investigation into the division of 
marital property upon the dissolution of Islamic marriages in Ghana could be an important 
research topic.  
 
A project on how legal information systems could contribute to improving the rights of 
women in Ghana if information about their legal rights is made easily accessible to them, is 
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8.2 Interview Guides 
 
8.2.1 Interview Guide For Respondents Who Are Legal Experts 
 
Introduction 
I am a student from the University of Oslo (Norway), conducting a research on “The 
Matrimonial Property Rights Of Spouses Upon Divorce In Ghana.” I am here to gather 
relevant data for this purpose. Part of my method for gathering research materials is 
through discussions with people with legal opinion on the topic of my research. This 
research is for academic purposes only and responses will be kept with uncompromising 
confidentiality. Thank you for your time. 
 
                                                 
270 Source: https://www.google.no/?gws_rd=cr&ei=KQR8UvbbCoeMswbv74GgBA#q=map+of+ghana+in+africa. Accessed 07.11.2013. 
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1. What is your name? (Optional) 
 
2. Can you explain what your job entails? On a day-to-day basis, for example.   
 
3. Are you aware of the Mensah v. Mensah case from February this year (2012)? (If I 
get yes for an answer I continue with the next question. If the respondent answers 
with a no, then I explain what the case entails.  It is a case in which the court 
amongst other things ruled that household chores should be accorded the same 
weight as paid jobs, and should therefore be enough to entitle the stay-home spouse 
to an equal share of property acquired during the marriage) 
 
4. What do you think about the court´s ruling in this case?  
 
5. If this ruling is made a statutory law, what do you think will be the possible 
challenges that may be faced in an attempt to enforce it? 
6. What do you think this case will mean for the ordinary Ghanaian woman? 
7. How do you think this would work in polygamous marriages? 
8. Why do you think parliament has not yet made legislation on the property 
settlement upon divorce? 
9. Do you think this case will prompt parliament make legislation on the property 
settlement upon divorce? 
 
8.2.2 Interview Guide For Academicians Without Legal Background 
 
Introduction 
I am a student from the University of Oslo, conducting a research on “The Matrimonial 
Property Rights Of Spouses Upon Divorce In Ghana.” I am here to gather relevant material 
for this purpose. Part of my method for gathering research materials is through discussions 
with academicians who are not legal experts, on the topic of my research. This research is 
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for academic purposes only, and all responses will be kept with uncompromising 
confidentiality. Thank you for your time. 
 
1. What is your name? (Optional) 
2. How old are you? 
3. What is you education level 
- Masters degree or above 
- Bachelors degree 
4. Can you explain what your job entails? On a day-to-day basis, for example.   
 
1. Are you aware of the Mensah v. Mensah case from February this year (2012)? (If I 
get yes for an answer I continue with the next question. If the respondent answers 
with a no, then I explain what the case entails.  It is a case in which the court 
amongst other things ruled that household chores should be accorded the same 
weight as paid jobs, and should therefore be enough to entitle the stay-home spouse 
to an equal share of property acquired during the marriage) 
 
5. What do you think about the court´s ruling in this case?  
 
6. Would you consider being a stay-home spouse given the fact that this new case 
favours stay-home spouses?  
- If yes, why? If no, why? 
7. What do you think this case will mean for the ordinary Ghanaian woman? 
 
8. How do you think this would work in polygamous marriages? 
9. Why do you think parliament has not yet made legislation on the property 
settlement upon divorce? 
10. Do you think this case will prompt parliament to make legislation on property 
settlement upon divorce that accords home-making the same relevance as paid jobs? 
11. If this ruling is made formal law, what do you think will be the possible challenges 
that may be faced in an attempt to enforce it? 
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8.2.3 Interview Guide For Semi-Litterates And Illiterates (Who Have Been 
Through The Process Of Property Settlement Upon Divorce) 
 
Introduction 
I am a student from the University of Oslo, conducting a research on “the matrimonial 
property rights of spouses upon divorce in Ghana.” I am here to gather relevant material for 
this purpose. Part of my method for gathering research materials is through discussions 
with people on the topic of my research. This research is for academic purposes only and 
all responses will be kept with uncompromising confidentiality. Thank you for your time. 
 
1. What is your name? (Optional) 
2. How old are you? 
3. What is you education level 
- Basic education 
- Elementary school 
- Illiterate 
4. What do you work with? 
5. How did you and your spouse divide the property you had acquired in the course of 
the marriage when you got divorced?  
6. Do you think the outcome would have been different if you had taken the issue to 
court? 
 
2. Are you aware of the Mensah v. Mensah case from February this year (2012)? (If I 
get yes for an answer I continue with the next question. If the respondent answers 
with a no, then I explain what the case entails.  It is a case in which the court 
amongst other things ruled that household chores should be accorded the same 
weight as paid jobs, and should therefore be enough to entitle the stay-home spouse 
to an equal share of property acquired during the marriage) 
 
7. What do you think about the court´s ruling in this case?  
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8. What do you think this case will mean for the ordinary Ghanaian woman? 
9. How do you think this would work in polygamous marriages? 
 




The property rights of spouses bill is a 21 page document which is available at: 
https://www.google.com/search?q=the+property+rights+of+spouses+bill+ghana&oq=the+
property+rights+of+spouses+bill+ghana&aqs=chrome..69i57.6689j0j8&sourceid=chrome
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